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Comment
THE NEIGHBORS ARE WATCHING: TARGETING SEXUAL
PREDATORS WITH COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the wisdom of society's gatekeepers on such matters, he
moved into a quiet neighborhood in Hamilton Township, New
Jersey, with two other "recovering" sexual offenders. He made
friends with the neighborhood kids, letting them play with his
puppy. Because he was considered a quiet and gentle man, he
was able to lure his little neighbor Megan Kanka, 7, to a heinous
death. He raped and strangled her.1
The tragic story of Megan Kanka's death is not uncommon; her slaying is one of many murders that involved a violent crime and a young
victim. 2 The brutal nature of these crimes, and the crime against Megan
1. Suzanne Fields, We Should Lock Them Up for Life: Megan's Law Doesn't Really
Protect Society from Sexual Predators,ATtrqArAJ., Mar. 6, 1995, at A8. The "he" in the
quotation, who stands accused of the murder of Megan Kanka, is Jesse Timmendequas, a convicted pedophile. SeeJames Popkin, NaturalBorn Predators,U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Sept. 19, 1994, at 65, 66 (detailing history and accusations against
Timmendequas). Prior to Megan Kanka's rape and murder, Timmendequas and
two other convicted child abusers had moved into a house across the street from
the Kankas' home. Id. at 66. Timmendequas allegedly lured Megan Kanka into
his house and then sexually assaulted and strangled her. Id. For additional media
reports of the Kanka murder and the frenzy to enact protective legislation following the crime, see Jennifer Buksbaum, N.J. Victims'ParentsSee Crime Bill Signed Urge
Action To Protect Others' Children, THE REcoRD (Northern NJ.), Sept. 14, 1994, at
A17; Malcolm Gladwell, N.J. Law on Released Sex Offenders Proves Problematic: ExInmates Must Report Addresses, but Enforcement Is Burdensome, Some Are Harassed,WASH.
POST, Jan. 16, 1995, at A6; Richard Jerome, Megan's Legacy, PEOPLE, Mar. 20, 1995,
at 46.
2. See, e.g., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJusTICE STATISTICS - 1993, at 385 (Kath-

leen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1994) (noting 1992 murder rate of United

States victims under age 13 to be 1.8 per 100,000 persons). In March of 1994, a
formerly convicted sex offender who had a history of sex offenses raped and murdered six-year-old Amanda Wengert of New Jersey. Michelle Ruess, Megan's Law
Signed By Governor,THE RECORD (Northern NJ.), Nov. 1, 1994, at Al. Twenty-oneyear-old Kevin Aquino plead guilty to Wengert's murder. Sheri Tabachnik & Lisa
L. Colangelo, Doubts Linger Over Bargain With Killer, ASBURY PARK PRESS, July 28,
1995, at All. In 1989, Westley Allan Dodd kidnapped, raped, tortured and murdered four-year-old Lee Iseli. Joanne Jacobs, Punish Sexual Predators,THE RECORD
(Northern N.J.),Jan. 18, 1993, at All. Dodd stated that if released, he would rape
and kill again. Id. Therefore, Dodd refused to appeal his death sentence and
requested hanging as a fit punishment. Id. In another 1989 crime, a previously

convicted sex offender raped, stabbed, strangled and sexually mutilated a sevenyear-old Washington state boy. David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and
in the Word, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 525, 525 (1992). The boy was found in a
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Kanka in particular, has fired public outrage over the release of convicted
sex offenders into our communities.3 In response, within approximately
three months after Megan Kanka's death, New Jersey Governor Christine
Todd Whitman signed into law a package of bills designed to deal more
harshly with sex offenders. 4 Certain provisions of the new law, popularly
referred to as Megan's Law, prescribe procedures for notifying area resi5
dents when a released sex offender moves into their community.
wooded area near his home in a state of shock: he had been violently raped,
stabbed in the back, strangled with a cord and had his penis severed. Id. at 525-26.
The young victim's attacker, Earl Shriner, was a repeat offender with a criminal
history dating back to 1966. Id. at 526 (quoting Past Sex Offender Suspect in Attack Boy Too Traumatized to Cry by Mutilation, TACOMA MORNING NEWS TmB., May 22,
1989, at Al). In response to public outrage over the attack, lawmakers of the State
of Washington enacted the Community Protection Act of 1990. Jacobs, supra at
All; see Community Protection Act, ch. 3, §§ 101-1406, 1990 Wash. Laws 12 (codified as amended in scattered sections of WASH. REv. CODE). The Community Pro-

tection Act contains 14 separate sections addressing topics such as the registration

of released sex offenders, crime victims' compensation, community notification,

sexual motivation in criminal offenses, criminal sentencing, civil commitment and
background checks. Id. For an overview of the Community Protection Act, see
Norm Maleng, The Community ProtectionAct and the Sexually Violent PredatorsStatute,
15 U. PUGET SOUND L. Rxv. 821 (1992). For other articles discussing sex crimes
against child victims, see Daniel Golden, Sex-Cons, BOSTON GLOBE (Sunday Magazine), Apr. 4, 1993, at 12; David A. Kaplan, The Incorrigibles, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 18,

1993, at 48.
3. Lisa Anderson, Demand Grows to ID Molesters: States Weigh Children's Safety
Versus Offenders' Rights, CHI. TmB., Aug. 15, 1994, at 1; see also Stephen Chapman,
Lowering the Boom on Sex Offenders: Is There a Better Way? CHI. TRm., Aug. 21, 1994, at
3 (noting that sexual predator crime issue "provok[ed] rallies ... and ground-

swell(s] in Congress" demanding better protections against risk that predators
pose).
4. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-6 to -7 (West 1995) (requiring community
notification concerning release of certain sex offenders); id. § 2C:7-8 (establishing
system to determine risk of re-offense released sex offender poses to community

and correspondingly providing for notification to police, neighbors, community
organizations and schools about threatening offenders living in area); id. § 2C:7-2
to -5(requiring released sex offenders to register with local police); id. §§ 2C:43-7,
2C:44-3 (providing for sentencing of sexually violent'predators); id. § 2C:47-3 to -5
(authorizing involuntary civil commitment of mentally ill and dangerous sexual
offenders); id. § 30:4-123.53a (requiring Department of Corrections to notify prosecutors before sex offenders or other violent criminals are released and correspondingly prosecutors to notify Office of Victim-Witness Advocacy and local law

enforcement); id. § 2C:43-6.4 (permitting sentence of community supervision for

life for certain sex offenders); id. § 2C:47-8 (making repeat and compulsive sex
offenders at Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center in Avenel, NewJersey, ineligi-

ble for early release due to "good behavior" if they refuse therapy); id. § 2C:44-3g
(allowing prosecutors to seek extended sentence for violent sex offenders whose
victims are younger than age 16).
5. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-6 to -9 (West 1995) (providing for community notification regarding release of certain convicted offenders). The provision that provides for notice to residents when a convicted sex offender moves into their
community after his or her release from prison is one of the more controversial
measures of the New Jersey sex offender laws. Compare Bruce Fein, When a Sex
Offender Moves in,Is There a Duty to Warn the Community? Yes: Community Self-Defense
Laws Are Constitutionally Sound, A.B.A.J., Mar. 1995, at 38 (arguing that community
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Megan's Law is based on the popular belief that if residents had
known a convicted sex offender was living in their township, they may have
been able to prevent Megan Kanka's death. 6 This issue of "knowledge"
notification laws do not constitute punishment in constitutional sense and do not
violate right to privacy) with Edward Martone, When a Sex Offender Moves in, Is There
a Duty to Warn the Community? No: Mere Illusion of Safety Creates Climate of Vigilante
Justice, A.BA. J., Mar. 1995, at 39 (asserting community notification laws cause
compulsive sex offenders to run from family, avoid treatment and seek anonymity
by hiding out, thus subjecting public to greater risk); see Ben Gerson, Does New York
Need a 'Megan'sLaw'?, NEWSDAY, Jan. 22, 1995, at A43 (noting arguments for and
against enactment of community notification laws in New York State).
The amendments to Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes provide in pertinent
part:
c. The regulations shall provide for three levels of notification depending upon the risk of re-offense by the offender as follows:
(1) If risk of re-offense is low, law enforcement agencies likely
to encounter the person registered shall be notified;
(2) If risk of re-offense is moderate, organizations in the community including schools, religious and youth organizations shall be
notified in accordance with the Attorney General's guidelines, in addition to the notice required by paragraph (1) of this subsection;
(3) If risk of re-offense is high, the public shall be notified
through means in accordance with the Attorney General's guidelines
designed to reach members of the public likely to encounter the person registered, in addition to the notice required by paragraphs (1)
and (2) of this subsection.
d. In order to promote uniform application of the notification
guidelines required by this section, the Attorney General shall develop
procedures for evaluation of the risk of re-offense and implementation of
community notification. These procedures shall require, but not be limited to, the following:
(1) The county prosecutor of the county where the person was
convicted and the county prosecutor of the county where the registered person will reside, together with any law enforcement officials
that either deems appropriate, shall assess the risk of re-offense by
the registered person;
(2) The county prosecutor of the county in which the registered person will reside, after consultation with local law enforcement officials, shall determine the means of providing notification;
and
e. The Attorney General's guidelines shall provide for the manner
in which records of notification provided pursuant to this act shall be
maintained and disclosed.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8 (West 1995).

In addition, the law provides that "any person who provides or fails to provide
information relevant to the procedures set forth in this act shall not be liable in
any civil or criminal action," but that nothing in this act "shall be deemed to grant
any such immunity to any person for his willful or wanton act of commission or
omission." Id. § 2C:7-9. Finally, the law provides that nothing in the act shall be
"construed to prevent law enforcement officers from providing community notification concerning any person who poses a danger under circumstances that are
not provided for in this act." Id. § 2C:7-10.
6. Chapman, supra note 3, at 3 (reporting that Megan Kanka's parents could
have kept Megan away from man who confessed to Megan's murder had they
known of his prior convictions for sexual molestation); see also Tom Avril, Legal
Challenges Arise for Megan's Law: Community Notification Provisions Have Run Into
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goes to the heart of the debate; questions exist concerning the efficacy
7
and constitutionality of community notification laws.
Laws directed at released sex offenders, however, are not new. A majority of state legislatures have enacted statutes that require sex offenders
to register with local law enforcement authorities upon their release from
prison.8 In addition, a few state statutes provide for the involuntary civil
commitment of dangerous sex offenders. 9 Finally, a growing number of
states have followed New Jersey's lead and have enacted laws that permit
community notification. 10 In light of the community notification provisions of the Federal Crime Bill,11 it appears that community notification
laws are gaining wide acceptance, and that the American public's demand
for the protection of potential victims has at long last taken precedence
over the rights of released offenders to return to society unobtrusively.
This Comment examines the various forms of sex offender legislation
and focuses on the current interest in the enactment of community notification laws. First, in Part II(A), this Comment discusses the various state
approaches to sex offender legislation: state laws that provide for the registration of released sex offenders; laws that mandate the civil commitment of certain offenders; and laws that provide notice to residents when a
released offender moves into their community.' 2 Second, in Part II(B),
this Comment examines the Federal Crime Bill and its provisions that
mandate the establishment of community notification programs in each
state. 13 Third, Parts III and IV address the potential problems inherent in
-Trouble in the Courts, PHILA.

INQUIRER, Mar. 5, 1995, at E3 (reporting opinion of
Sen. Stewart J. Greenleaf (R., Montgomery) that putting citizens on guard is best
way to prevent future crimes).
7. See, e.g., Artway v. Attorney General, 876 F. Supp. 666, 671-92 (D.N.J. 1995)
(discussing challenges to constitutionality of New Jersey's Sexual Offender Registration Act); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 387-422 (N.J. 1995) (same); State v.
Babin, 637 So. 2d 814, 824 (La. Ct. App.) (discussing constitutionality of Louisiana
notification law), cert. denied, 664 So. 2d 649 (La. 1994). For a further discussion of
Artway, see infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of
Doe, see infra notes 101-12 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of
Babin, see infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of state statutes that require released sex offenders to register with local law enforcement officials, see infra notes 23-35 and accompanying
text.
9. For a discussion of state statutes that provide for the involuntary civil commitment of sex offenders, see infra notes 36-76 and accompanying text.
10. For a listing and discussion of state community notification statutes, see
infra notes 77-119 and accompanying text.
11. 42 U.S.CA. § 14071 (West 1995). The Federal Crime Bill requires all
states to establish community notification programs for released sex offenders. Id.
The states have until September 13, 1997 to institute notification programs. Id.
For a further discussion of select provisions of the Federal Crime Bill, see infra
notes 120-37 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of state laws directed toward released sex offenders, see
infra notes 16-119 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the Federal Crime Bill, see infra notes 120-37 and accompanying text.
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the use of community notification programs. 14 Finally, Part V of this Comment proposes limited application of community notification programs as
15
a means of protecting citizens.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

State Laws Directed Toward Released Sex Offenders

Due to the nature of their crimes and the controversy concerning
their treatment, the media has given a lot of attention to offenders criminally convicted of sex offenses against children.1 6 Moreover, in response
to the increasingly outspoken voice of victims' rights advocates, states have
enacted a variety of laws to address the perceived threat that sex offenders
17
pose after their release from prison.
Legislation at the state level reflects a movement toward placing increased restrictions on the freedom of released sex offenders.18 These
statutes generally fall into one of three categories, although some states
have laws that cover more than one category.' 9 The first type of statute
14. For an evaluation of the consequences of community notification and the
problems inherent in disclosure systems, see infra notes 138-76 and accompanying
text.
15. For concluding remarks proposing limited application of community notification provisions, see infra notes 177-92 and accompanying text.
16. See generally, Popkin, supra note 1. For a board-certified psychiatrist's per-

spective concerning the difficulty of legislatively classifying persons as sexual
predators, see James D. Reardon, Sexual Predators:Mental Illness or Abnormality? A
Psychiatrist'sPerspective, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 849 (1992).
17. See Golden, supra note 2, at 12 (discussing growing community interest in
receiving notification); Nekesa Mumbi Moody, State to Permit Access to Records of Sex
Offenders, Burr. NEWS, July 26, 1995, at A9 (noting New York is latest state to adopt
a "Megan's Law"). For a discussion of state registration statutes, see infra notes 2335 and accompanying text. For a discussion of civil commitment statutes, see infra
notes 36-76 and accompanying text. For a discussion of state community notification programs, see infra notes 77-119 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 387-88 (NJ. 1995) (noting pace of
recently-adopted community notification laws suggests notification laws may become as common as registration statutes).
19. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.130 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring
sex offenders to register); id. §§ 71.09-010 to -120 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) (providing for civil commitment of certain offenders); id. § 4.24.550 (West Supp. 1995)
(authorizing law enforcement officials to disseminate registrant information to
community residents). Since 1990, a majority of the states have enacted registration programs, a minority of the states have enacted civil re-commitment statutes
and a growing number of states have enacted community notification statutes. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-200 (1994) (registration statute); ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.63.010 (Supp. 1994) (same); ARiz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821 (Supp. 1994)
(same); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995) (same); COLO. REv.
STAT. §§ 16-13-201 to -216 (1986 & Supp. 1994) (civil commitment statute); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 22-3503 to -3511 (1989) (same); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.22 (West
Supp. 1995) (same); LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 15:546A (West Supp. 1995) (notification statute); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-6 (West 1995) (same); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 181.508(2) (Supp. 1994) (community notification statute); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-39-106(c) (Supp. 1995) (same); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09-010 to -120
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requires released sex offenders to register with the local law enforcement
officials of the community into which they move. 20 The second type of
statute provides for the involuntary civil commitment of convicted sex offenders after the offenders have served their prison sentences. 2 1 The
third type of statute requires that notification be given to community resi22
dents when a released sex offender moves into their neighborhood.
1.

State Registration Statutes

State registration statutes directed toward released sex offenders are
currently in force in most states. 23 These statutes require that an individual who has been convicted of a certain type of offense register with the
local law enforcement authorities of the area into which he or she
moves. 24 Typical registration statutes require a registrant to notify local
(West 1992 & Supp. 1995) (civil commitment statute). For a discussion of state
registration programs, see infra notes 23-35 and accompanying text. For a discussion of civil commitment statutes, see infra notes 36-76 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of state community notification programs, see infra notes 77-119
and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of state statutes that require released sex offenders to
register with local law enforcement authorities, see infra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of state statutes that provide for the civil commitment of
sexual offenders, see infra notes 36-76 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of state statutes that provide for notice to community
residents, see infra notes 77-119 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-200 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010 (Supp.
1994); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821 (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-904
(Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); COLO.
REV. STAT. f18-3-412.5 (Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120 (Supp. 1994);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.22 (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.1 (1995);
IDAHO CODE

§ 18-8304 (Supp. 1995); ILL.

ANN. STAT.

ch. 730, para. 150 (Smith-

Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-12-1 to -12, -13 (West Supp.
1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4901 to -4910 (Supp. 1994); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17.510-.540 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:540:549 (West Supp. 1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11001-11004 (West Supp.
1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 46-23-501 to -507 (1993); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 207.151-.157 (Michie 1992 &
Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:11 to :19 (Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:7-2 to -5 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (Supp. 1995); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 2950.01-.99 (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 581-587
(West 1991 & Supp. 1995); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 181.507-.519 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 11-37-16 (1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 22-22-31 to -39 (Supp. 1995);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to -108 (Supp. 1995); TEX. REv. CrV. STAT. ANN. art.

6252-13c.1 (West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5 (1995); VA.
ANN. §§ 19.2-298.1 to -298.3 (Michie Supp. 1995); WASH. REv. CODE

CODE
ANN.

§ 9A.44.130 (West Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8F-1 to -8 (Supp. 1995); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 175.45 (West Supp. 1994); WYo. STAT. §§ 7-19-301 to -306 (Supp.
1995); Act ofJune 9, 1994, 1994 Conn. Acts 94-246; Act of May 3, 1995, 1995 Iowa
Legis. Serv. 259 (West); Act ofJuly 13, 1994, 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts 194; Registration
of Sexual Offenders, Act No. 24 of Special Session 1995 - No. 1, 1995 Pa. Legis.
Serv. (Purdon) (to be codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795).
24. Registration with local law enforcement authorities is generally required
regardless of whether the offense was committed within or without the jurisdiction.
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25
authorities when he or she changes residence within the state, specify
26
the duration of the duty to register, and provide procedures whereby an

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-200 (1994); ALAsKA STAT. § 12.63.010(a) (Supp.
1994); Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821A (Supp. 1994); AR& CODE ANN. § 12-12904(a) (Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a) (West 1988 & Supp.
1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-412.5(1) (Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4120(a) (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.22(2) (West Supp. 1995); IDAHO
CODE § 18-8304(i) (Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para. 150/3 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-5 (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 224904(a) (Supp. 1994); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17.510(4)-(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542.A (West Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 34-A, § 11003.1 (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 243.166.1, .9
(West Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-504 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 207.152.1 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:12 (Supp. 1994);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2 (West 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15.2 (Supp.
1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.02 (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57,
§ 584.A (West Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-16(a) (1994); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-39-103 (Supp. 1995); TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13C.1.2 (West Supp.
1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5(5)-(7) (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.1.C
(Michie Supp. 1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.130(1) (West Supp. 1995);
W. VA. CODE § 61-8F-2 (Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 175.45(3) (West Supp.
1994); Wyo. STAT. § 7-19-302 (Supp. 1995). For a discussion of the primary issues
that confront states when drafting registration statutes, see Julia A. Houston, Note,
Sex Offender RegistrationActs: An Added Dimension to the War on Crime, 28 GA. L. REv.
729, 736-46 (1994) (recommending registration for those committing sexual offenses against adults and children; duration of registration be tied to severity of
offense; failure to file be classified as felony offense; and incorporation of public
notification provisions in registration statutes regarding certain offenders).
25. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-200 (1994); ALAsKA STAT. § 12.63.010(c)
(Supp. 1994); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3822 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12904(b)(1) (Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(f) (West Supp. 1995);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120(f) (Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 18-8304(2) (Supp.
1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para. 150/6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE
ANN. § 5-2-12-8 (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4904(b) (1) (Supp. 1994);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17.510(7) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 15:542.C (West Supp. 1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 11003.3
(West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166.3(b) (West Supp. 1995); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-23-505 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.152.2 (Michie Supp.
1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:15 (Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2.d
(West 1995); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2950.05 (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 57, § 584.B (West Supp. 1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 181.519 (Supp. 1994); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 11-37-16(f) (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-103 (Supp. 1994); TEX.
REv. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c.1.4 (West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2721.5(8) (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.1C (Michie Supp. 1995); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 9A.44.130(4) (West Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE § 61-8F-3 (Supp.
1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 175.45(4) (West Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. § 7-19-302(c)
(Supp. 1995).
26. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 12.63.020 (Supp. 1994) (15 years for single sexual
offense and life for two or more sexual offense convictions); AIL CODE ANN. § 1212-906 (Michie Supp. 1993) (10 years); IDAHO CODE § 18-8305 (Supp. 1995) (10
years); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para. 150/7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995) (10 years);
IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-13 (West Supp. 1995) (duty to register terminates when
individual is discharged from parole or probation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4906
(Supp. 1994) (10 years for single conviction and life upon second conviction); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:544A (West Supp. 1995) (10 years); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
34-A, § 11003.1 (West Supp. 1994) (15 years); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166.6 (West
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individual who is statutorily required to register may be relieved of the

duty.2 7 In addition, most registration statutes prohibit the public disclosure of registrant information, although a few states permit public disclosure in limited circumstances.2 8 Finally, many registration statutes apply
Supp. 1995) (10 years); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-506 (1993) (10 years); N.H.

REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:16 (Supp. 1994) (10 years or life depending on crime of
conviction); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15.6 (Supp. 1995) (10 years); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 2950.06 (Anderson 1994) (10 years); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57,

§ 583.C (West 1991) (10 years); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-16(d) (3) (A) (1994) (duty
to register terminates at age 25 for juvenile convicts); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
6252-13c.1.9 (West Supp. 1995) (duty to register terminates on sexual offender's
twenty-first birthday or when discharged from parole or probation); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-298.2

(Michie Supp.

1995)

(15 years); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.

§ 9A.44.140(1) (West Supp. 1995) (10 to 15 years); W. VA. CODE § 61-8F-4 (Supp.
1995) (10 years); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 175.45(5) (West Supp. 1994) (15 years); Wyo.
STAT. § 7-19-304(a)(ii) (Supp. 1995) (10 years).
27. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-908 (Michie Supp. 1993) (registrant may
apply to state circuit court for order for relief from duty to register); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 290.5 (West 1988) (registrant may initiate proceeding for certificate of rehabilitation for relief from further duty to register); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3412.5(7) (Supp. 1994) (registrant may petition district court for order to discontinue registration requirement); IDAHO CODE § 18-8310 (Supp. 1995) (registrant
may petition county district court for order to expunge registration information);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4908 (Supp. 1994) (registrant may apply to county court for
order relieving him or her of duty to register); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:544.B
(West Supp. 1995) (registrant may petition court for relief from duty to register);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 11003.4 (West Supp. 1994) (sex offender may peti-

tion superior court to waive registration requirement); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 207.156 (Michie 1992) (registrant may apply to district court for order relieving
him of registration duty); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2.f (West 1995) (registrant may
apply to state Superior Court to terminate obligation to register upon proof registrant has not committed an offense within 15 years following release and does not
pose threat to others' safety); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-16(k) (1994) (registrant may
petition for expungment of records and for relief from duty to register); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-39-107 (Supp. 1995) (registrant may petition county circuit court
for order relieving him of duty to submit registration/monitoring forms to state
bureau of investigation); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.3 (Michie Supp. 1995) (registrant may petition circuit court for removal of registrant information from state
Sex Offender Registry); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.140(2)-(3) (West Supp.
1995) (registrant may petition superior court for relief from registration duty);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 175.45(7) (c) (West Supp. 1994) (registrant may request state
department ofjustice expunge registration information on grounds that his or her
conviction, delinquency adjudication, finding of need of protection or services, or
commitment was reversed, set aside or vacated); WYo. STAT. § 7-19-304(b) (Supp.
1995) (registrant may petition district court to be relieved of duty to register).
28. For states that prohibit public inspection of registration information, see
ALA. CODE § 13A-11-202 (1994); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3823 (1989); AaK
CODE ANN. § 12-12-909 (Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290(i), 290.4(f)
(West Supp. 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-412.5(6)

(Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE

ANN. tit. 11, § 4120(i) (Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para. 150/9 (SmithHurd Supp. 1995); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17.510(11) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166(7) (West 1992); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632A:17 (Supp. 1994); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2950.08 (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 57, § 584.C (West Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-16(i) (1994); TEX.
REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c.1.5(a) (West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-27-21.5(11) (1995); W. VA. CODE § 61-8F-5 (Supp. 1995).
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to individuals who were incarcerated at the time of the statute's enactment, as well as to individuals who may be imprisoned and released at
29
some future time.
At first glance, registration statutes appear to violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. 30 The Ex Post Facto Clause
For states that permit limited disclosure of registrant information to state
agencies employing individuals who work with children or provide services to chil-

dren, see

DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

11, § 4120(i) (Supp. 1994);

IND. CODE ANN.

§ 5-2-12-

11 (West Supp. 1995); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.155.2 (Michie Supp. 1993); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-390.1B (Michie Supp. 1995); WYo. STAT. §§ 7-19-106(a), -303(b)
(Supp. 1995). For a listing of statutes that permit the disclosure of registrant information to the public, see infra note 77.
29. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.100(2) (Supp. 1994) (defining "sex offender" to include those convicted of sex offenses before, on, or after August 10,
1994); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995) (imposing duty to
register on those who, since July 1, 1944, have been or are thereafter convicted of
certain sex offenses); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-412.5(1)-(2) (Supp. 1994) (requiring individuals convicted of certain offenses on and afterJuly 1, 1994 and individuals paroled on and afterJuly 1, 1994 to register); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120(a)
(Supp. 1994) (mandating registration requirement on those "hereafter convicted
...
of any sexual offense" and on those paroled after serving sentences for sex
crime convictions); IDAHO CODE § 18-8303 (Supp. 1995) (imposing duty to register
on those convicted of certain offenses on or after July 1, 1993, and on individuals
found guilty of certain crimes before July 1, 1993 and who are currently incarcerated or on probation); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-12-4, -12-5 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring registration of those on probation or parole for certain sexual offenses);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.510(2)-(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994) (imposing duty to register on individuals convicted of sex crimes who are paroled from
prison after January 1, 1995 and on persons convicted of sex crimes afterJanuary
1, 1995); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:542A (West Supp. 1995) (mandating registration for any adult residing in Louisiana who has pled guilty or been convicted of
any sex offense); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166.1 (West Supp. 1995) (imposing duty
to register on those convicted of certain offenses); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-502,
-504 (1993) (requiring individuals convicted of sexual offenses to register); NEv.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 207.151-.152 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1993) (defining "sex offender" to include those who, after July 1, 1956, had been or are convicted of
certain sexual offenses); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:11 (III), -A:12 (Supp. 1994)
(imposing duty to register on sex offenders regardless of date of conviction);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-102(2), -103 (Supp. 1995) (requiring registration of
individuals convicted of sexual offenses afterJanuary 1, 1995; individuals placed on
probation afterJanuary 1, 1995 for sex crime convictions decreed before that date;
and individuals discharged from incarceration on and after January 1, 1995). But
see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.'730, para. 150/2(A), 150/3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995) (defining "child sex offenders" as those convicted of certain sex offenses after July 1,
1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 582 (West Supp. 1995) (imposing duty to register
on those convicted of certain offenses after November 1, 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-37-16(a) (1994) (imposing duty to register on those who, since July 1, 1992,
have been or are thereafter convicted of certain offenses).
30. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (stating that "f[n]o State shall.., pass any
... ex post facto Law"). In Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), the United
States Supreme Court interpreted the ex post facto provision to prohibit the following: (1) laws that make criminal an innocent act done before the passing of
the law; (2) laws that aggravate a crime or that make it a greater crime than when it
was committed; (3) laws that change the punishment and inflict greater punishment than was mandated when the crime when committed; and (4) laws that alter
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of the United States Constitution forbids the states from enacting any law
that increases the amount of punishment associated with a crime after the
crime was committed. 3 1 Many courts, however, have upheld registration
statutes against this constitutional challenge and have found that registration laws do not impose additional punishment upon a convicted
offender. 32 Courts have reasoned that such statutes aid law enforcethe legal rules of evidence in order to convict the offender. Id. at 390. After a
period of judicial expansion of the four categories of prohibited laws, the Calder
categories were re-established as the parameters for ex post facto law. Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 47-52 (1990).
31. BLACK's LAw DicrIONARY 580 (6th ed. 1990). More specifically, an ex post
facto law is defined as "a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed." Id.
32. See, e.g., State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992); State v. Costello,
643 A.2d 531, 534 (N.H. 1994); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1066-68 (Wash.
1994). But see Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1380 (D. Alaska 1994) (concluding plaintiffs likely to succeed on claim that Registration Act violates prohibition
on ex post facto laws because law allowed for public dissemination of information
concerning sex offenders whose convictions antedated Registration Act); In re
Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 222 (Cal. 1983) (invalidating state law requiring registration of
only certain types of sex offenders as punitive).
The test for determining whether a statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause
involves ascertaining whether the law (1) punishes as a crime an act previously
committed, which was not a crime when done; (2) makes the punishment for a
crime more burdensome after its commission (is retrospective); or (3) deprives
one charged with a crime of any defense available according to the law at the time
the act was committed (it disadvantages the person affected by it). Ward, 869 P.2d
at 1067-68. Moreover, the ex post facto prohibition applies only to laws that inflict
criminal punishment. Id. at 1068 (citing Johnson v. Morris, 557 P.2d 1299, 1304
(Wash. 1976); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 999 (Wash. 1993)). To determine
whether a law is punitive (criminal in nature) or regulatory (civil in nature), a
court must first look to the legislature's purpose in enacting the law. Id. at 1069.
Even if the stated purpose is regulatory, a court must examine whether the effect
of the statute is "so punitive as to negate the legislature's regulatory intent." Id.
(citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)). To determine
whether the statute's effect is punitive, a court should employ the factors listed in
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). Ward, 869 P.2d at 1068 (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
The Mendoza-Martinez factors focus attention on the statute's effects. Id. at
1068. The Mendoza-Martinez analysis first requires a court to decide whether the
challenged statute involves an affirmative disability or restraint. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. at 168-69. Second, a court must consider whether the challenged statute's requirements historically have been regarded as punishment. Id. Third, a
court must determine whether the statute is relevant only on a finding of scienter.
Id. Fourth, a court must consider whether the statute's operation will "promote
the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deterrence." Id. (footnote
omitted). Fifth, a court must examine whether the behavior to which the statute
applies is in fact a crime. Id. Sixth, a court must consider whether it can assign any
alternative purpose to which the statute may be rationally connected. Id. Seventh,
a court must evaluate whether the statute appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Id. These factors will assist a court in determining

whether the statute's effect is to impose punishment or whether the statute's effect
is merely regulatory in nature. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1069. If a court finds the statute
imposes additional punishment, then the statute violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Id. at 1068.
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ment;3 3 that the registration of sex offenders does not constitute punishment;3 4 and that retroactive application of registration statutes is not ex
35
post facto when no greater punishment is imposed.
2.

State Civil Commitment Statutes

State statutes that provide for the civil commitment and treatment of
36
sexual offenders in lieu of punishment have existed since the 1940s.
These early statutes classified sex offenders among the mentally ill and
provided for their commitment and treatment in a manner similar to that
33. See, e.g., Noble, 829 P.2d at 1223. In Noble, the Supreme Court of Arizona
applied the Mendoza-Martinez factors to a state law that required sex offenders to
register. Id. at 1221-24. After acknowledging that the statute had both punitive
and regulatory effects, the court concluded that "on balance, requiring convicted
sex offenders to register pursuant to [the statute] is not punishment" and therefore "retrospective application of the statute to these defendants does not violate
the ex post facto clause of the United States or Arizona Constitution." Id. at 1224.
The court emphasized that "as applied to child sex offenders, [the registration
requirement] is not excessive in relation to its non-punitive, law enforcement purpose." Id.; see also People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ill. 1991) (noting that
Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act was designed to aid law
enforcement).
34. See, e.g., Ward, 869 P.2d at 1074. In Ward, the Supreme Court of Washington analyzed the state's registration statute under the Mendoza-Martinez factors to
determine whether the statute's effect was punitive in nature. Id. at 1067-74. It

concluded that "[o]n balance ... the requirement to register as a sex offender
under [the statute] does not constitute punishment" and thus the law did not violate the ex post facto prohibitions. Id. at 1074.
A similar result was reached in State v. Douglas, 586 N.E.2d 1096 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1989), appeal dismissed, 550 N.E.2d 484 (Ohio 1990), where the appellant
argued that the Ohio registration requirement for habitual sex offenders violated

the cruel and unusual punishment prohibitions found in the United States and
Ohio Constitutions. Id. at 1097. The Court of Appeals of Ohio disagreed and held
that requiring the defendant to register violated neither the federal nor the state
constitutions. Id. at 1099. The court described the registration requirement as a
"modest burden" upon the defendant and explained that the information was for
law enforcement purposes. Id. In addition, the court noted that the registration
was "not a public record." Id.
35. See, e.g., Costello, 643 A.2d at 534. In Costello, the defendant argued that the
state registration requirement was ex post facto because it applied to him retrospectively. Id. at 532. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire disagreed and held
that "as the sexual offender registration requirement inflicts no greater punishment, no ex post facto violation occurs in the application of the law to the defendant." Id. at 534. The court reasoned that the law enforcement community held
the registration information confidential and that facially, the statute did not purport to be punitive. Id. at 533; see also State v. Taylor, 835 P.2d 245, 247-49 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1992) (holding that retrospective application of registration requirement
did not disadvantage defendant to extent it constituted additional punishment violative of ex post facto prohibition), review denied, 877 P.2d 695 (Wash. 1994).
36. See Carol Veneziano & Louis Veneziano, An Analysis of Legal Trends in the
Disposition of Sex Crimes: Implicationsfor Theory, Research, and Policy, 15 J. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 205, 206-07 (1987) (noting that until research is done on impact of legislation
in this area, legislative policies are not likely to be effective).
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accorded mentally ill patients. 3 7 Many of these statutes, however, were repealed in the 1970s as attention shifted from providing treatment to sexual offenders to punishing them.3 8 Today, the trend is toward enacting
statutes that permit the civil commitment of released sex offenders after
39
they have already served their criminal sentences.
The State of Washington has enacted one of the more controversial
civil commitment statutes, entitled Sexually Violent Predators,4 that only
37. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6300-6330 (West 1984), repealed by
1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 928, § 2, at 3485; Act of Apr. 2, 1953, ch. 186, 1953 Kan. Sess.
Laws 334 (repealed 1970); Act of April 21, 1939, ch. 369, 1939 Minn. Laws 712
(codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 26.09-.10) (repealed 1994).
38. Veneziano & Veneziano, supra note 36, at 216-17; see also Beth Keiko Fujimoto, Sexual Violence, Sanity, and Safety: ConstitutionalParametersfor Involuntary Civil
Commitment of Sex Offenders, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 879, 879-81 (1992) (discussing state trend to repeal involuntary civil commitment laws that emphasized
treatment of sex offenders through commitment procedures). For states that provide for the civil commitment of sexual offenders in lieu of incarceration, see
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-13-201 to -216 (1986 & Supp. 1994) (granting district
courts authority to, in lieu of sentence, commit sexual offenders to custody of de-

partment of corrections for indeterminate term);

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§§ 17a-

561 to -572 (West 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3503 to -3511 (1989) (providing for
civil commitment of persons determined to be sexual psychopaths and permitting
stay of any pending criminal proceedings); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 205
(Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1995) (codifying Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act that provides for commitment of sexually dangerous offenders); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, §§ 1-11 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995) (providing for treatment
and rehabilitation of sexually dangerous persons, and for serving of sex crime conviction sentence concurrently with commitment for treatment); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 526.09-.11 (West Supp. 1994); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-2922 to -2936 (Supp. 1994)
(allowing for commitment and treatment of convicted sex offenders); OR. REv.
STAT. §§ 426.510-.680 (1993) (providing for commitment and treatment of sexually dangerous persons); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-6-301 to -306 (1984 & Supp.
1995) (authorizing commitment of sex offenders determined to be dangerous because of mental illness and permitting civil commitment for first-time non-violent
sex offenders who plead guilty); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-16-1 to -5 (1995) (providing that medical examiners give mental examinations to individuals convicted of
sex crimes and correspondingly allowing for hospitalization); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 19.2-300 to -302 (Michie 1995) (allowing sentence deferral for persons convicted of sex crimes); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-09.902 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1995) (permitting civil commitment of released offenders); Wis. STAT.
§§-975.01(2), .06 (1985 & Supp. 1994) (providing that persons convicted of certain sex offenses be committed to state department of health and social services for
treatment).
39. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-.902 (West 1992 & Supp.
1995) (entitling statute "Sexually Violent Predators" and establishing procedures
for civil commitment of released sex offenders). For a further discussion of the
Washington statute, see infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
40. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-.120 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
Washington's statute is controversial because it authorizes the civil commitment of
certain sexual offenders for an indefinite period of time so as to prevent the offender's reentry into the community after having served a sentence in which attempts at rehabilitation have failed. Id. For a general discussion of Washington's
power to commit sexual predators, see Brian G. Bodine, Comment, Washington's
New Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System: An UnconstitutionalLaw and an Unwise Policy Choice, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 105, 107-10 (1990) (suggesting that
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a few states have followed. 4 1 The Sexually Violent Predators statute is part
of the state's Community Protection Act of 1990,42 which Washington
lawmakers enacted in response to citizen concern that state laws treated
violent sex offenders too leniently.4 3 The Sexually Violent Predators stat-

ute authorizes the involuntary civil commitment of a criminal sex offender
who has served his or her sentence if a state psychiatric board has determined that the individual is a "sexually violent predator."44 The statute
commitment power is based on combination of state police power and parens patriae power, thus protecting society as well as offender.
41. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2901 (1994) (providing for civil commitment of sexually violent predators); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.185 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1995) (authorizing civil commitment of sexually dangerous or sexually psychopathic persons); NJ. STAT. ANN'"§ 2C:47 (West 1995) (providing for involuntary civil commitment of dangerous sexual offenders).
42. See Community Protection Act, ch. 3, §§ 101-1406, 1990 Wash. Laws 12
(1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE). Washington's sexual predator laws include provisions for the civil commitment of certain
sexual offenders. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). For a
discussion of the civil commitment provisions, see infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
43. See Fujimoto, supra note 38, at 880-83 (discussing history behind enactment of Washington's sex offender involuntary commitment statute). The Washington state legislature enacted the Sexually Violent Predators statute because of
the public outrage following a 1989 attack on a seven-year-old boy in the state by a
repeat offender, Earl Shriner. Jacobs, supra note 2, at All. For a discussion of
some of the factors that led to the enactment of the statute, see supra note 2. A
Washington court had committed Shriner to the state Department of Institutions
as a "defective delinquent" as punishment for killing a teenage girl whose body
Shriner led the police to in 1966. Id. Psychiatrists at Eastern State Hospital stated
in 1966 that Shriner was too dangerous to be at large. Id.
Shriner was convicted of subsequent sexual crimes in 1977. Id. at 526-27. He
was convicted of the kidnapping and second degree assault of two teenage girls
and was later sentenced to two consecutive 10-year terms. In re Shriner, 627 P.2d
99, 99-100 (Wash. 1981). In 1978, hewas determined not to be amenable to psychological treatment and an order suspending his sentence was revoked. Id. at 99.
Therefore, the Washington State Supreme Court ordered the Board of Prison
Terms and Paroles to reset Shriner's sentencing to run concurrently. Id. at 101.
After Shriner's release from prison, officials were unable to commit Shriner as
mentally ill under the state's civil commitment laws because he exhibited no recent overt acts of dangerousness. Boerner, supra note 2, at 527. As a result, following his release in 1987, Shriner committed further assaults on children. Id. at 528.
For these crimes, he served less than 250 days in jail. Id.
The community was outraged after Shriner mutilated the seven-year-old boy
in 1989 due not only to the barbaric nature of the crime, but also to the press'
subsequent publication of Shriner's criminal history. See id. at 529-32. This response contributed to the establishment of a Task Force charged with examining
the manner in which the state's criminal system treated offenders who did not
qualify for civil commitment but who presented a danger to the community. Id. at
538. The Task Force's determinations led to the enactment of the state's civil commitment statute. Id. at 562-75. For a further discussion of Washington's Sexually
Violent Predators statute, see infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
44. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). The statute defines a "sexually violent predator" as a person "who has been convicted of or
charged with a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality
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also provides for various procedural safeguards to ensure that the civil
commitment of an offender complies with the constitutional requirements
45
of due process.
State commitment statutes that authorize the indefinite commitment
of sexual predators for treatment purposes will undoubtedly face future
constitutional challenges given their novelty. 46 Washington's civil commitment statute was challenged on constitutional grounds in the case of
Young v. Weston. 47 In Young, the petitioner was involuntarily committed
under the Sexually Violent Predators statute after having served a sentence

or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts
of sexual violence." Id. § 71.09.020(1).
45. Id. § 71.09.080. Under the statute, when a convicted offender's sentence
for a sexually violent offense is about to expire or has expired, the state may file a
petition alleging that the person is a sexually violent predator. Id. § 71.09.030. A
judge must then determine ex parte if "probable cause exists to believe that the
person ... is a sexually violent predator." Id. § 71.09.040. If probable cause is
found, the individual is placed in custody and transferred to a facility for evaluation. Id.
Within 45 days, the court must conduct a trial to determine if the person is a
sexually violent predator. Id. § 71.09.050. The alleged predator has a statutory
right to counsel and may be examined by an expert of his or her choice. Id. The
state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a
sexually violent predator. Id. § 71.09.060(1). If the state carries its burden, the
detainee shall be committed to a facility for control, care and treatment until the
detainee is "safe to be at large." Id. Treatment centers are limited to mental
health facilities located within correctional institutions. Id. § 71.09.060(3),
§ 10.77.220.
Annual examinations must be made of the detainee to determine his or her
mental condition and the results must be provided to the trial court. Id.
§ 71.09.070. The detainee may obtain an additional examination at state expense.
Id. If it is determined that the detainee is no longer a sexually violent predator,
the Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services shall authorize the
detainee to petition the court for release. Id. § 71.09.090(1). Upon this filing, the
court shall order a hearing within 45 days. Id. Either party may demand ajury and
the state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the detainee
is not safe for release at large. Id.
The detainee may petition the court without the Secretary's approval. Id.
§ 71.09.090(2). If the detainee does not affirmatively waive his or her annual right
to petition, then upon the filing of such a petition, a hearing to show cause is held.
Id. If the court finds probable cause exists to believe that the detainee is no longer
dangerous, then a full hearing is held. Id. The court will not hold additional
hearings unless the detainee can show a change of condition. Id. § 71.09.100. For
a critical analysis of evidentiary issues in sexual predator prosecutions, see Robert
C. Boruchowitz, Sexual PredatorLaw - The Nightmare in the Halls of Justice, 15 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REv. 827, 832-42 (1992) (proposing that psychological speculations regarding mental abnormality be subject to same evidentiary standard as
blood and breath machines).
46. See, e.g., Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995). The
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington held the state's
Sexually Violent Predators statute unconstitutional. See id. The Supreme Court of
Washington, however, had upheld the constitutionality of the law. In reYoung, 857
P.2d 989, 1018 (Wash. 1993). For a further discussion of Young v. Weston, see infra
notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
47. 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
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for a rape conviction. 48 He challenged his commitment as an unconstitutional preventive detention and argued that the statute was substantively
and procedurally deficient. 49 The United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington agreed with the petitioner, holding that
the statute was unconstitutional on its face.5 0 The court reasoned that the
statute violated the substantive protections of the Due Process Clause and
that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the United States Constitution.5 1
Prior to Young, however, constitutional challenges brought against
civil commitment statutes have generally been unsuccessful for two reasons.5 2 First, courts have widely recognized that the states may enact civil
48. Id. at 748. Andre Brigham Young was convicted of rape on three occasions over a period of 22 years. Id. In October 1990, one day prior to his scheduled
release from prison on a 1985 conviction, the State filed a petition under the Sexually Violent Predators statute to commit Young. Id. Young was transferred to the
state's Special Commitment Center and held until his trial in February 1991. Id.
The jury concluded that Young was a sexually violent predator and, as a result, he
was committed. Id. On direct appeal from the trial court, the Washington
Supreme Court held the statute was constitutional. Young, 857 P.2d at 1018.
49. Young, 898 F. Supp. at 748. The petitioner asserted that the Sexually Violent Predators statute, specifically § 71.09, violated the substantive due process
component of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I
and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
50. Id. at 746.
51. Id. at 754. First, the court held that the statute violated the substantive
protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the
statute allowed the indefinite confinement of persons who are not mentally ill. Id.
at 751. The court reasoned that predictions of dangerousness alone were an insufficient basis to indefinitely incarcerate an offender who has completed his prison
term. Id. Second, the court held that the statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause
because as to the petitioner, it operated retrospectively and disadvantaged the petitioner. Id. at 753. Third, the court held that the statute violated the Double Jeop-

ardy Clause because the statute served the traditional aims of punishmentretribution and deterrence. Id. at 753-54. The court stated that "[h]aving once
been punished for the commission of a violent sexual offense, the offender is subject to further incarceration under the Statute's commitment scheme." Id. at 754.
The court, therefore, concluded that the "punishment imperative" embodied in
the statute rendered the statute an unconstitutional second punishment. Id. For a
critique of Washington State's Sexually Violent Predators statute, see Erin Gunn,
Washington's Sexually Violent PredatorLaw: The "Predatory"Requirement, 5 UCLA WoLJ. 277, 281-83 (1994) (arguing Sexually Violent Predators law constitutes

MEN'S

criminal statute that unconstitutionally permits preventive detention).
52. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979). In Addington, the
Supreme Court addressed the standard of proof required in a civil commitment
proceeding to involuntarily commit an individual for an indefinite period of time
to a state mental hospital. Id. at 419-20. The Court reasoned that "the standard
has to inform the factfinder that the proof must be greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to other categories of civil cases." Id. at
432-33. It held, therefore, that the trial court's standard of "clear, unequivocal and
convincing" evidence was constitutionally adequate. Id. at 433; see also In re D.C.,

656 A.2d 861, 868-70 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1995) (noting NewJersey's involuntary
civil commitment procedures protect fundamental liberty interests and ensure due
process of law and holding that offender could not be involuntarily committed
where Attorney General failed to follow statutory civil commitment procedures); In
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commitment laws to care for and protect mentally ill citizens. 53 Second,
courts have allowed the states to enact laws to protect their citizens from
54
the dangerous tendencies of those who are mentally ill.

Moreover, the United States Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of state civil commitment statutes in Allen v. Illinois5 5 and Foucha

v. Louisiana.5 6 In both cases, the Court indicated that the commitment of
dangerous persons is constitutionally permissible when the commitment
57
statute is essentially civil in nature.
For example, in Allen, the Court concluded that proceedings under
the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act were not criminal in nature
and therefore upheld the detainee's preventive detention. 58 The petitioner in Allen challenged the Illinois Supreme Court's decision to reinstate the trial court's finding that the petitioner was a sexually dangerous
person. 59 Specifically, the petitioner asserted that the trial court had violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by permitting
re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 376 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming appellant's commitment to state hospital as mentally ill, dangerous and psychopathic personality
under state civil commitment statute in face of Confrontation Clause challenge).
53. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986) (stating that fact that psychiatric
center housed criminals in addition to sexually dangerous persons does not transform states' intent to treat into intent to punish); Addington, 441 U.S. at 426 (holding that states can act under their parens patriaeauthority on behalf of mentally ill
for their own protection and treatment); Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
1984) (recognizing state's parens patriaepower to treat mentally ill patients against
their will when necessary).
54. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426. A state may enact legislation under its police
powers to protect citizens from the dangerous conduct of those who are mentally
ill. Id.; see alsoJones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) (holding that insanity acquittee could be committed under state civil commitment statute but can
be held only so long as individual is both mentally ill and dangerous).
55. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
56. 504 U.S. 71 (1992). For a discussion of Foucha, see infra notes 68-74 and
accompanying text.
57. Foucha,504 U.S. at 86 (invalidating state statute which lacked requirement
that state prove basis of confinement by clear and convincing evidence); Allen, 478
U.S. at 370 (noting (1) State's disavowal of any interest in punishment; (2) provision for treatment of detainees; (3) establishment of system under which detainees
can be released after briefest commitment period; and therefore, upholding detainee's commitment).
58. Allen, 478 U.S. at 375. The Court noted that the Illinois statute provided
for civil commitment in lieu of criminal punishment and therefore determined

that the statute served the purposes of treatment, not punishment. Id. at 373.
Moreover, the Act did "not appear to promote either of 'the traditional aims of
punishment - retribution and deterrence.'" Id. at 370 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)). For the text of the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 205 (Smith-Hurd 1992 &

Supp. 1995).
59. Allen, 478 U.S. at 367-68. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial
court's finding of dangerousness, stating that there was "sufficient evidence to establish defendant's sexually dangerous status beyond a reasonable doubt." People

v. Allen, 481 N.E.2d 690, 698 (Ill. 1985).
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two psychiatrists to testify at trial after having interviewed him. 60 The
United States Supreme Court stated that the defendant must provide "the
clearest proof" that a statute is so punitive, either in purpose or effect, as
to negate the state's intent that the proceedings be civil. 6 1 The Court dismissed the petitioner's allegations and held that the proceedings under
the statute were essentially civil in nature, and thus the constitutional pro62
tection against self-incrimination was not implicated.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court considered four factors as
indicative of the civil nature of proceedings under the Illinois Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act. 63 First, the Court examined whether the commit64
ment statute required a finding of a potential detainee's mental illness.
Second, the Court evaluated whether the statute reflected a legislative intent that was not punitive in nature. 65 Third, the Court considered
whether the statute provided for the treatment of detainees who were ad60. Allen, 478 U.S. at 366-70. The trial court had ordered the petitioner to
submit to two psychiatric examinations to assist the court in determining whether
the petitioner was a sexually dangerous person. Id. at 366. At a bench trial on the

State's petition to declare the petitioner a sexually dangerous person, the State
presented the testimony of the two psychiatrists who had interviewed the petitioner. Id. The petitioner objected to admission of the testimony and argued that
the psychiatrists had elicited information from him in violation of his privilege
against self-incrimination. Id. The trial court allowed each psychiatrist to give his
opinion but ruled that the petitioner's statements themselves were not admissible.
Id. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's finding of dangerousness and held that the privilege against self-incrimination was unavailable in sexually-dangerous person proceedings because such proceedings were civil in nature.
Id. at 367.
61. Id. at 369.
62. Id. at 375. The Court concluded that the proceedings were not criminal
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 374. The Court stated that it
was "unpersuaded by petitioner's efforts to challenge [the] conclusion" of the Illinois Supreme Court, which had reviewed the Act and its own caselaw and concluded that the proceedings were essentially civil in nature. Id. at 369. The Court
reasoned that the fact a person is adjudged sexually dangerous under the Act and
is committed to an institution that houses convicts who require psychiatric care
does not make the conditions of confinement amount to punishment and thus
render the commitment proceedings criminal. Id. at 372. In addition, the Court
noted that the Illinois legislature expressly provided that proceedings under the
Act were to be civil in nature. Id. at 368.
63. See id. at 369-71.
64. Id. at 370-71. The Court concluded that the Illinois statute met this requirement because the Illinois Supreme Court "has construed the Act to require
proof of the existence of a mental disorder for more than one year and a propensity to commit sexual assaults, in addition to demonstration of that propensity

through sexual assault." Id.
65. Id. at 368. The Court concluded that the Illinois statute was not punitive
because Illinois "expressly provided that proceedings under the Act 'shall be civil
in nature,' indicating that when [the state] files a petition against a person under
the Act it intends to proceed in a nonpunitive, noncriminal manner, 'without regard to the procedural protections and restrictions available in criminal prosecutions.' " Id. (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249
(1980)).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [1995], Art. 7

1274

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40: p. 1257

judged to be sexually dangerous. 6 6 Finally, the Court noted whether the
statute set forth procedures for the release of a detainee after the briefest
67
period of confinement.
In keeping with the reasoning in Allen, the United States Supreme
Court invalidated a Louisiana civil commitment statute in Foucha v. Louisiana68 because the statute failed to require a finding of a detainee's mental
illness. 69 The trial court in Foucha found the petitioner Foucha not guilty
by reason of insanity on burglary charges. 70 After spending four years in a
mental institution, a panel at the institution reported that Foucha showed
no signs of mental illness and recommended his conditional discharge. 7 1
However, one doctor testified at Foucha's commitment hearing that
Foucha suffered from an antisocial personality and testified that he would
not be comfortable certifying that Foucha would not be a danger upon
release. 72 The trial court concluded that Foucha was a danger to himself
73
and others and ordered that he be returned to the mental institution.
On appeal, the Supreme Court invalidated the statute under which
Foucha was committed on the grounds that it failed to require a finding
74
that Foucha was mentally ill.
66. Id. at 369. The Court noted that Illinois met this requirement because
"[u]nder the Act, the State has a statutory obligation to provide 'care and treatment for [persons adjudged sexually dangerous] designed to effect recovery.'" Id.
67. Id. at 369-70. The Court found that this factor was met in the Illinois
statute because "[iun short, the State has disavowed any interest in punishment,

provided for the treatment of those it commits and established a system under
which committed persons may be released after the briefest time in confinement."
Id. at 370. Also, a detainee could apply for release at any time. Id. at 369.

68. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
69. Id. at 77, 85-86. The Court held that absent a showing that Foucha was
mentally ill, it was impermissible for the State to confine Foucha based solely on
the State's determination that Foucha was dangerous. Id. at 80, 85-86.
70. Id. at 74. The State charged Foucha with aggravated burglary and the
illegal discharge of a firearm. Id. at 73. Initially, the trial court found that Foucha
lacked the mental capacity to proceed. Id. Four months later, Foucha was found
competent to stand trial and was found not guilty by reason of insanity. Id. at 74.
71. Id. at 74. Foucha was committed to the East Feliciana Forensic Facility
"until such time as doctors recommended that he be released." Id. Approximately
four years later, the Feliciana superintendent recommended that Foucha be discharged or released. Id. Thereafter, a three member panel recommended Foucha
be conditionally discharged. Id.
72. Id. at 75. The doctor testified that Foucha evidenced no signs of psychosis
or neurosis and was in "good shape" mentally. Id. However, the doctor stated that

Foucha had an antisocial personality, "a condition that is not a mental disease and
that is untreatable." Id.

73. Id. The appellate court refused supervisory writs and the Louisiana
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "Foucha had not carried the burden placed
upon him by the statute to prove that he was not dangerous." Id.
74. Id. at 80. The statute's failing was that it did not require a finding of a
detainee's mental illness in addition to a finding of dangerousness. Id. The Court
held that in civil commitment proceedings, "the State must establish insanity and
dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence in order to confine an insane
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If a state commitment statute provides sufficient indicia of the civil
nature of the commitment proceedings, then it may be upheld as constitutionally sound. 75 On the other hand, if a statute seeks to commit a sex
offender after his or her release from incarceration based on a mere prediction of future dangerousness, the statute will very likely be held
76
unconstitutional.
3.

State Community Notification Statutes

State community notification statutes permit local law enforcement
authorities to notify citizens when a convicted sex offender moves into
their neighborhood. 77 Thus, once a released offender registers with local
law enforcement officials, the officials can disseminate registrant informaconvict beyond his criminal sentence, when the basis for his original confinement
no longer exists." Id. at 86.
The problem with the Illinois statute was that Foucha bore the burden of
proving that he was not a danger to the community. Id. at 82. He was not afforded
a hearing at which the state was required to prove his dangerousness. Id. at 81.
The Court held, therefore, that the statute violated due process. Id. at 86.
75. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986) (holding that proceedings under Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act not to be criminal within meaning of Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination). For a
further discussion of Allen, see supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 751 (W.D. Wash. 1995). The
district court held Washington's Sexually Violent Predators statute to be unconstitutional, noting that, like the commitment scheme invalidated in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), the Washington statute "permits indefinite incarceration
based on little more than a showing of potential future dangerousness." Young,
898 F. Supp. at 749.
77. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.087(b) (1994) (providing that registration
information is confidential except as to sex offender's name; address; photograph;
place of employment; date of birth; crime of conviction; date, court, and place of
conviction; and length of sentence); IDAHO CODE § 9-340(11) (f) (ii) (Supp. 1995)
(allowing for dissemination of information upon written request); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 15:546A (West Supp. 1995) (authorizing criminal justice agencies to release
relevant information regarding sex offenders to public); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
34A, § 11004 (West Supp. 1994) (permitting disclosure of one's status as registered
sexual offender upon written request pursuant to state Criminal History Record
Information Act); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-5 to -11 (West 1995) (requiring that notice be given to community residents depending on risk of re-offense presented by
released offender); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15.8 (Supp. 1995) (permitting inspection of registrant information by public); OR. REv. STAT. § 181.508(2)(c)
(Supp. 1994) (permitting disclosure to residential neighbors and churches, community parks, schools, businesses, and other places that children or other potential
victims may frequent); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-106(c) (Supp. 1995) (allowing
local law enforcement agencies to release sex offender registrant information if
necessary to protect public); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.120 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1995) (authorizing release of relevant information necessary to protect public); Act of April 7, 1994, 1994 Kan. Sess. Laws 107 (amending § 22-4909 to allow
inspection ot registration information by public); Registration of Sexual Offenders, Act No. 24 of Special Session 1995 - No. 1, 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. (Purdon) (to
be codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9798). For lists of state statutes that permit the
limited disclosure of registrant information and that prohibit public inspection of
registration information, see supra note 28.
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tion as they deem appropriate. 78 Notification laws serve a much different
purpose than registration laws, which essentially provide a means of keeping track of released offenders. 79 The rationale behind notification laws is
that notice to community residents is the best way to protect them, as citizens are forewarned that a sex offender is in their midst.8 0 Although state
community notification statutes are less typical than statutes that implement registration programs, notification laws are growing in popularity. 8'
Five states at the forefront of the movement to enact community notification laws include Washington, Louisiana, New Jersey, Tennessee and
Alaska.82 Washington's community notification statute was enacted in
1990 as part of a comprehensive package of legislation directed toward
sexual offenders.8 3 Louisiana followed Washington's lead by enacting its
78. See, e.g.,

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 40-39-106(c) (Supp. 1995) (permitting re-

lease of registrant information by local law enforcement as necessary to protect
public). For a list of state statutes that authorize the dissemination of information
to the public, see supra note 77. For a discussion of the Federal Crime Bill provisions that give state law enforcement authorities discretion in the dissemination of
registrant information, see infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (West 1995) (stating NewJersey Legislature's finding that danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders requires registration system that permits law enforcement officials to identify and alert public when
necessary for public safety and that will provide information critical to preventing
and resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and missing persons); Houston,
supra note 24, at 733-34 (noting that registration laws may help law enforcement
officials keep track of offenders to prevent re-offenses, may facilitate investigation
once crime has occurred and may help prevent offender from repeating his or her
crime by making offender admit his or her problem and by reinforcing seriousness
of his or her crime).
80. Jill Porter, Megan's Law Might Create FalseSecurity, PHLA. DAiLY NEWS, Jan.
6, 1995, at 12 (stating notification laws designed to make families aware of danger); see also Chapman, supra note 3, at 3 (indicating parental preventive measures
may follow notification). But seeAnderson, supra note 3, at 1 (noting no studies yet
measure effect of notification statutes on communities and sex offenders).
81. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 387-88 (N.J. 1995) (noting that community notification laws are less common than registration laws but that pace of recently-adopted notification laws suggests they may become common).
82. See ALAsKA STAT. § 18.65.087 (1995); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:546A (West

Supp. 1995); N.J.

STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-6 to -11 (West
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §

39-106(c) (Supp. 1995);
1995).

1995);

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 40-

71.09.120 (West 1992 & Supp.

83. See Community Protection Act, ch. 3, §§ 101-1406, 1990 Wash. Laws 12
(1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections ofWASH. REv. CODE) (providing
for community notification provisions). Under Washington's notification provisions, public agencies are authorized to release relevant information when necessary to protect the public concerning a specific sexual predator or sexual
psychopath. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.120 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
Furthermore, the statute provides for official immunity in the dissemination
of information. Id. § 4.24.550(2). Elected public officials, public employees or
public agencies are "immune from civil liability for damages for any discretionary
decision to release relevant and necessary information" unless it is shown that the
individual or agency acted with "gross negligence or in bad faith." Id. Public officials, public employees and public agencies are also immune from liability for the
failure to release information as provided in § 4.24.550. Id. § 4.24.550(4).
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community notification and registration statute in 1992.84 In 1994, the
NewJersey Community Notification Bill became law8 5 and the Alaska Legislature amended its laws to provide for public notification.8 6 On January
1, 1995, the Tennessee notification statute went into effect.8 7 These statutes are among the first of their kind and each contains provisions similar
to the notification measures prescribed in the Federal Crime Bill. 88
Although there have been few constitutional challenges to community notification laws, given the "newness" of these statutes, future challenges will undoubtedly be brought following the states' implementation
of notification programs as the Federal Crime Bill requires.8 9 A starting
point in determining the validity of such laws, however, is Artway v. Attorney
General,9 0 Doe v. Poritz9 ' and State v. Babin.9 2 In Artway and Doe, the plaintiffs challenged New Jersey's sexual offender registration law9 3 and community notification law94 -popularly referred to as Megan's Law-on

84. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:546A (West Supp. 1995). Under the statute,
"criminal justice agencies [may] release relevant and necessary information regarding sex offenders to the public when the release of the information is necessary for public protection." Id. The statute further provides for immunity from
civil liability for damages for any discretionary decision to release information unless it is shown that the disseminating official or agency acted with "gross negligence or in bad faith." Id. § 15:546B. Moreover, no liability shall be imposed
upon any official or agency for failing to release information on registrants. Id.
§ 15:546C.
85. See Act of Oct. 31, 1994, ch. 128, 1994 N.J. Laws 526 (codified at N.J. Rv.
§ 2C:7-6). For a further discussion of New Jersey's Community Notification
Act and the state's Violent Predator Incapacitation Act of 1994, see supranotes 4-5.
86. See Act effective Aug. 10, 1994, ch. 41, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 171 (amending AiAsKA STAT. § 18.65.087 to provide for public disclosure of sex offender registry data including offender's name; address; photograph; place of employment;
date of birth; crime of conviction; date of conviction; place and court of conviction; and length of sentence).
87. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-39-106(c) (Supp. 1995) (permitting local law enSTAT.

forcement agencies to release relevant information as necessary to protect public
regarding specific sex offender).

88. See 42 U.S.CA. § 14071 (West 1995). For a discussion of the community
notification provisions of the Federal Crime Bill, see infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
89. Id. For a discussion of the Federal Crime Bill provisions that require each
state to establish a community notification program, see infra notes 122-32 and
accompanying text.
90. 876 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1995).
91. 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).

92. 637 So. 2d 814 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 644 So. 2d 649 (La. 1994).
93. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to -5 (West 1995).
94. Id. § 2C:7-6 to -11.
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constitutional grounds. 95 In Babin, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Louisiana's community notification law. 96
In Artway, the plaintiff asserted, inter alia, that Megan's Law violated
the prohibition against ex post facto laws. 9 7 The United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey noted that the New Jersey Legislature
intended Megan's Law to be regulatory and non-punitive in nature. 98 The
court, however, engaged in ex post facto analysis to determine the "true
nature" of the law. 99 It concluded that the public notification provisions
of Megan's Law constituted "more a form of punishment than a regulatory
95. Artway v. Attorney General, 876 F. Supp. 666, 667 (D.N.J. 1995); DoA 662
A.2d at 380. The sexual offender registration and notification provisions are part
of a package of New Jersey bills designed to deal more harshly with sex offenders.
Act of Oct. 31, 1994, 1994 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 526, 538 (West). For a further
discussion of the New Jersey community notification and registration acts, see
supra note 5 and accompanying text.
96. Babin, 637 So. 2d at 817, 823-24. For a further discussion of Babi, see
infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
97. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 668. The plaintiff asserted that the registration

and notification requirements deprived him of "his right to due process, equal
protection and privacy, that it violate[d] the constitutional prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment [and] the prohibition against ex post facto laws,
and that it constitute[d] a bill of attainder." Id. The court, however, examined
only the constitutional challenges that the court perceived as having particular
validity and declined to address the plaintiff's due process and equal protection
arguments. Id. at 671. Moreover, the court elected to address the plaintiff's
Eighth Amendment, right to privacy and double jeopardy arguments, to the extent
they were relevant, in its ex post facto analysis. Id. at 677-85. Finally, the court
held that Megan's Law did not violate the prohibition against bills of attainder. Id.
at 684.
98. Id. at 673 (noting legislature's stated aim that Megan's Law be regulatory
and non-punitive). The New Jersey statute reads in pertinent part:
The Legislature finds and declares:
a. The danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders and offenders
who commit other predatory acts against children ... require a system of
registration that will permit law enforcement officials to identify and alert
the public when necessary for the public safety.
b. A system of registration of sex offenders.., will provide law en-

forcement with additional information critical to preventing and
promptly resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and missing persons.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (West 1995).
99. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 673. The court noted that it "must focus on the
practical purpose and effect of the statute and reach an independent conclusion as
to its true nature." Id. First, the court acknowledged that the challenged statute,
Megan's Law, was retrospective in application. Id. The court noted that, therefore, it was required to engage in ex post facto analysis, which begins with a determination of whether Megan's Law is regulatory or punitive. Id. Although the New
Jersey Legislature stated that Megan's Law was regulatory, the court noted that the
proper inquiry should focus on the "practical purpose and effect" of the law. Id.
The court's analysis of the law's effect was conducted using the factors prescribed
in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). Artway, 876 F. Supp. at
673, 688-92. For a discussion of the court's application of the Mendoza-Martinez
factors, see infranote 100 and accompanying text. For a discussion of ex post facto
analysis, see supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
N.J.
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scheme" and therefore were unconstitutional in their retroactive
application. 100
In contrast to the district court's holding in Artway, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey upheld the constitutionality of the registration and
community notification provisions of Megan's Law in Doe v. Poritz.101 The
plaintiff Doe claimed that Megan's Law violated the Federal and State constitutional prohibitions against Ex Post Facto laws, Bills of Attainder,
Double Jeopardy, and Cruel and Unusual Punishment, in addition to constituting an invasion of privacy and a violation of the Equal Protection and
procedural Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution and the
10 2
New Jersey Constitution.
First, the Doe court reasoned that Megan's Law did not constitute
"punishment" and therefore did not violate the Ex Post Facto, Bill of At10 3
tainder, Double Jeopardy, or Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses.
100. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 692. The court first held the registration provisions of Megan's Law to be constitutional. Id. at 688. Next, it analyzed whether
the effect of the notification provisions constituted punishment within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. The court applied the Mendoza-Martinez factors and made the following determinations: that the public dissemination of
registrant information involves an affirmative disability or restraint; that the public
dissemination of registrant information would have been historically regarded as
punishment; that the operation of Megan's Law promotes deterrence, one of the
tradition aims of punishment; that the behavior to which Megan's Law applies is
already a crime; that although an alternate purpose may be rationally assignable to
Megan's Law, its inherent punitive aspect weighs in favor of finding the law punitive; and that Megan's Law appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
of facilitating law enforcement. Id. at 688-92. The court also noted, however, that
the registration requirements of Megan's Law are triggered only after scienter or
criminal mens rea has been proven. Id. at 689. It determined that this "scienter"
factor weighed in favor of finding the law to be regulatory. Id. at 689-90.
The court concluded that, on balance, the legislature's stated non-punitive
intent was "outweighed" by the court's determinations under the Mendoza-Martinez
factors. Id. at 692. It is important to note that the court addressed the constitutionality of Megan's Law only as the law is applied retroactively; the court declined
to rule on application of the law to offenders whose convictions followed the law's
October 31, 1994 enactment. Id. For a further discussion of the Mendoza-Martinez

factors, see supra note 32.
101. 662 A.2d 367, 372 (N.J. 1995). The court acknowledged, however, that
the prosecutor's decision to provide community notification is subject to constitutionally required judicial review. Id.
102. Id. at 380, 388-417. The Supreme Court of NewJersey noted that Doe's
ex post facto and bill of attainder claims applied only to previously convicted offenders. Id. The remaining claims applied to Doe as well as to individuals convicted after the enactment of Megan's Law. Id.
103. Id. at 403-06. The court rejected use of the Mendoza-Martinez factors to
determine whether the laws constituted punishment within the double jeopardy
and ex post facto context. Id. at 403. Instead, the court focused on the NewJersey
Legislature's intent as evidenced in the history of the legislation and the recitals in
the laws. Id. at 404. The court concluded that the laws and their implementing
provisions had "solely a regulatory purpose" and therefore did not constitute punishment within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto and DoubleJeopardy Clauses. Id.
at 405. The court next addressed whether Megan's Law violated the ban against
bills of attainder and the ban against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 405-06.
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Second, the court addressed the plaintiff's right to privacy claim by examining whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
information disclosed and whether any intrusion on his expectation of privacy was justified. 10 4 The court concluded that the plaintiff had no expectation of privacy in the information disclosed under the registration
law. 10 5 As to the disclosure of information under the notification law,
however, the court stated that "considering the totality of the information
disclosed to the public, the [notification law] implicates a privacy interest."' 06 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the state's interest in public disclosure substantially outweighed the plaintiff's interest in privacy
10 7
and therefore, held that disclosure was permissible.
The court stated that "[b] ecause the challenged provisions do not constitute punishment, they do not violate any constitutional prohibition against punishment."
Id. at 405. Therefore, the court concluded that the registration and notification
laws did not violate the Bill of Attainder or the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clauses of the United States Constitution or the New Jersey Constitution. Id. at
405-06.
104. Id. at 406-12. The plaintiff asserted that the registration and notification
laws "impermissibly infringe[d] on his interest in confidentiality." Id. at 406. The
court framed its analysis as first requiring a determination as to whether the plaintiff had a "reasonable expectation of privacy in the information disclosed." Id. If
the plaintiff did have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the second step would
require the court to determine whether any intrusion on his right to privacy was
justified by balancing the governmental interest in disclosure against the plaintiff's
private interest in confidentiality. Id.
105. Id. at 408. The court reasoned that "New Jersey specifically guarantees
public access to . . .criminal records;" that the state Parole Board was already

required to give public notice prior to considering any adult inmate for release;
and that prosecutors were required to notify crime victims of a defendant's release
from custody. Id. at 407. In addition, the disclosure of an individual's age and
legal residence or a description of his vehicle would not infringe on any expectation of privacy, as "that information is readily available through public records."
Id. Next, the court noted that "an individual cannot expect to have a constitution-

ally protected privacy interest in matters that are exposed to public view," such as
his physical appearance. Id. Finally, the court stated that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in one's fingerprints. Id.
106. Id. at 409. The court held that under the notification law, the plaintiff
had no expectation of privacy in his name, convictions, appearance, place of employment or school attended. Id. at 408. As to the disclosure of the plaintiff's

home address, however, the court held that this implicated his privacy interests,

stating that "(w]e are reluctant to disparage the privacy of the home, which is
accorded special consideration in our Constitution, laws, and traditions." Id. (citing United States Dep't of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 114 S.Ct.
1006, 1015 (1994)). The question was "whether inclusion of the address in the
context of the particular requested record raises significant privacy concerns, for
example, because the inclusion of the address can invite unsolicited contact or
intrusion based on the additional revealed information." Id. at 409. The court
concluded that the plaintiff's privacy interests were implicated given the totality of

the information disclosed. Id.
107. Id. at 411. The court considered the following factors to determine
whether the state's interest justified disclosure: (1) the type of record requested;
(2) the information it does or might contain; (3) the potential for harm in any
subsequent nonconsensual disclosure; (4) the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated; (5) the adequacy of safeguards to
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Finally, the court addressed the plaintiff's equal protection 0 8 and
procedural due process arguments.10 9 The court held that the registration and notification laws did not violate his right to equal protection
under the Federal or State Constitutions. 110 As to the procedural due process argument, the court agreed with the plaintiff, noting that his interest
in the nondisclosure of information and his interest in reputation constituted protectible liberty interests.11 1 The court concluded, however, that
Tiers Two and Three of Megan's Law required a hearing prior to notifica1 12
tion, thereby safeguarding the plaintiff's liberty interests.
The Louisiana notification statute was challenged on constitutional
grounds in State v. Babin.113 The defendant alleged, inter alia, that the
probation conditions that required the defendant to notify community
residents of his status as a convicted sex offender amounted to cruel and
unusual punishment." 4 The court declined to address Babin's cruel and
prevent unauthorized disclosure; (6) the degree of need for access; and (7)
whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other
recognized public interest militating toward access. Id. (citing Faison v. Parker,
823 F. Supp. 1198, 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1993)). The court further noted that "[t]he
state interest in protecting the safety of members of the public from sex offenders
is clear and compelling." Id. at 412.
108. Id. at 413. The plaintiff asserted that the notification and registration
requirements violated his right to equal protection because he was "entitled to be
treated as an individual and not classified with other sex offenders who, unlike
plaintiff, had not successfully completed treatment at the [state hospital for sex
offenders]." Id.
109. Id. at 417. The plaintiff argued that the dissemination of information
under the notification law impinged on his interest in nondisclosure and that classification under the notification law, with disclosure, thereby infringed on his interest in reputation. Id. The court agreed that both interests constituted
protectible liberty interests and therefore procedural protection was due. Id.
110. Id. at 415. The court applied rational basis review after noting that "[a]
classification that does not impact a suspect class or impinge upon a fundamental
constitutional right will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest." Id. at 413 (citing Brown v. City of Newark, 552 A.2d 125 (1989)).
The court then looked to one of its earlier decisions which held that creating a
separate classification for repetitive-compulsive sex offenders has a rational basis.
Id. at 414 (citing State v. Wingler, 135 A.2d 468 (1957)). Finally, the court noted
that "[t]he Legislature has determined that convicted sex offenders represent a
risk to the public safety and that knowledge of their identities and whereabouts is
necessary for protection of the public." Id. The court reasoned that because the
registration and notification requirements were rationally related to that legitimate
state interest, the requirements of equal protection were satisfied. Id.
111. Id. at417. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to procedural
protection because the statute implicated protectible liberty interests. Id.
112. Id. at 421. For a discussion of the three notification tiers established
under Megan's Law, see supra note 5.
113. 637 So. 2d 814 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 644 So. 2d 649 (La. 1994).
114. Id. at 817. The State charged Babin with the molestation of a juvenile
over whom he had supervision. Id. at 816. Following a bench trial, the judge
found Babin guilty as charged. Id. The trial court suspended Babin's prison term
and placed him on supervised probation for five years subject to the following
special conditions:
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unusual punishment argument and instead vacated the community notification conditions of his probation on ex post facto grounds.' 15 The court
held that the notification statute could not be applied as a condition of
Babin's probation because the statute was not in effect at the time he com1 16
mitted his crime of conviction.
Artway, Doe and Babin collectively reflect a division in the courts' appli117
cation of community notification statutes to released sex offenders.
Under the reasoning of Artway and Babin, courts may hold that retroactive
application of public notification statutes violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.' 1 8 Alternatively, courts may defer to state
(1) that he serve one year in ... jail with credit for time served; (2) that
[he] submit to psychological evaluation and, if indicated, obtain psychiatric counselling for the entire period of his probation unless discharged
earlier; (3) [that he] ...give notice of the crime for which he was convicted, his name and address to: (A) ...people ... who live within a one
mile radius [from] where [Babin] will reside upon release on probation;
(B) [t]he superintendent of the school district where [Babin] will reside
...; (4) [that he] give notice of the crime for which he was convicted, his
name [and] his address by mail to all people residing within the designated area within ...30 days of sentencing or within... 30 days of setting
up residency... and the notice shall be published on two separate days
within this ...30 days [sic] period ...in the official journal of the governing authority of the parish where [Babin] plans to reside .... and that
[Babin] shall state under oath where he will reside after sentencing and
that he will advise the Court of any subsequent change of address during
the probationary period; (5) that he pay a probation supervision fee of
$30.00 per month; (6) that he perform ...100 hours of community service ....
Id. at 824.
On appeal, Babin advanced various procedural assignments of error. Id. at
816-17. As to his constitutional argument, he asserted that the conditions of his
probation amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his federal
and state constitutional rights. Id. at 817. Specifically, Babin challenged the notification provisions as being "unduly onerous" and asserted that the notification requirement would subject him to possible vigilante attacks. Id. at 823-24.
115. Id. at 824. The court vacated two of the six conditions of Babin's probation. Id. The first vacated condition required Babin to give notice of his crime of
conviction, name and address to people residing within a one mile radius of where
he intended to reside. Id. The second vacated condition required Babin to give
notice, within 30 days of setting up residency, of his crime of conviction, name and
address by publication and by mail "to all people residing within the designated
area." Id.
116. Id. Babin's offense occurred over a period extending from January 1989
through February 1992. Id. The notification statute, however, took effect on August 21, 1992. Id. The court reasoned that because the notification provisions
were not in effect at the time Babin committed his crime, application of the statute
to Babin would be an "unconstitutional violation of the ex post facto provisions in
the [United States] and Louisiana Constitutions." Id.
117. For a further discussion of Artway, see supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Doe, see supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Babin, see supra notes 113-16 and

accompanying text.
118. Artway v. Attorney General, 876 F. Supp. 666, 692 (D.N.J. 1995) (holding
notification law constituted more a form of punishment than regulatory scheme
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legislatures that emphasize a regulatory intent behind the enactment of
notification laws and hence find that these laws do not constitute punishment within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause.1 19
B.

Federal Legislation that Requires States to Establish Community Notification
Programs

On September 13, 1994, President Clinton signed into law the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, popularly referred to as
the Crime Bill. 12 0 The various chapters of the Crime Bill provide a uniform approach to many areas of law enforcement, one of which is directed
21
toward released sex offenders.'
Title XVII of the Crime Bill, entitled the 'Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexual Violent Offender Registration Program," requires the states to establish registration programs for released sex offenders pursuant to guidelines set by the Attorney General. 122 Basically, these
state programs must require that certain individuals register with local law
enforcement agencies upon the individuals' release from prison. 123 Registration is required of any person "convicted of a criminal offense . . .
and therefore was unconstitutional in its retroactive application); Babin, 637 So. 2d

at 824 (holding notification statute could not be applied retroactively to
defendant).
119. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 403-06 (N.J. 1995) (focusing on state legislature's intent as evidenced in history of notification legislation and recitals in law
and concluding that notification law and implementing provisions had solely regulatory purpose and therefore did not constitute punishment within meaning of Ex
Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses).
120. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.CA.). For the legislative history of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, see 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801 (reprinting various Judiciary Committee and Conference House Reports from Congressional Record volumes 139 and
140).
121. 42 U.S.CA. § 14071 (West 1995). For the text of other topics that the
Crime Bill addressed, see id. § 13701 (prisons); id. § 13741 (crime prevention); id.
§ 13931 (violence against women); id. § 14051 (drug control); id. § 14061 (criminal street gangs); id. § 14081 (rural crime); id. § 14091 (training and education of
police corps and law enforcement officers); id. § 14131 (state and local law enforcement quality assurance and proficiency testing standards); id. § 14171 (motor
vehicle theft prevention); id. § 14181 (protections for elderly); id. § 14191 (Presidential summit on violence and national commission on crime prevention and
control); id. § 14211 (violent crime reduction trust fund).
122. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071. The Crime Bill directs the Attorney General to establish guidelines for state registration programs. Id. § 14071(a) (1). For the complete text of the Attorney General's proposed guidelines, see 60 Fed. Reg. 18,613
(proposed Apr. 12, 1995).
123. 42 U.S.CA. § 14071. Most states can easily meet the registration mandate of the Crime Bill because most states presently have statutes in effect that
require released sex offenders to register with local law enforcement officials. For
a lsting and discussion of state registration statutes, see supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
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against a . . . minor,"' 24 of any person "convicted of a sexually violent
offense," 12 5 or of any person determined to be a "sexually violent
1 26
predator."
In addition, the state registration programs must provide for the following: the transfer of information to the state and to the FBI; 1 27 the
establishment of an offender address verification procedure; 128 the notification to law enforcement agencies of changes in the registrant's address; 129 and the imposition of criminal penalties if a person who is
required to register fails to do so. 130 These programs must also set forth
the duties of state prison officials or the courts with regard to the enforcement of the programs, and prescribe the period for registration.'13 A
state that fails to implement a registration program will not be entitled to
receive funds that the Bureau ofJustice Assistance Grant Programs would
13 2
otherwise allocate to the state.

124. Id. § 14071(a)(1)(A).
125. Id.
126. Id. § 14071(a) (1) (B). Under the Crime Bill provisions, the sentencing
courts of each state are required to determine whether a person is a sexually violent predator. Id. § 14071(a) (2). A state board composed of "experts in the field
of the behavior and treatment of sexual offenders" will assist the sentencing court
in making this determination. Id.
127. Id. § 14071(b)(2). The statute reads in pertinent part:
The officer or... court shall, within 3 days after receipt of information [regarding a person who must register], forward it to a designated
State law enforcement agency. The State law enforcement agency shall
immediately enter the information into the appropriate State law enforcement record system and notify the appropriate law enforcement
agency having jurisdiction where the person expects to reside. The State
law enforcement agency shall also immediately transmit the conviction
data and fingerprints to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Id.
128. Id. § 14071(b)(3). Individuals required to register must verify their address on the anniversary of their initial registration date. Id. § 14071(b) (3) (A).
Individuals can verify their address by completing the verification form that the
state mails to the registrant's last reported address. Id. § 14071(b) (3) (A) (i). If the
person fails to mail the form to the designated state law enforcement agency
within 10 days after receipt, the person is in violation of the verification provisions.
Id. § 14071 (b) (3) (A) (iv). Persons required to register as sexually violent predators
must verify their registration every 90 days. Id. § 14071(b) (3) (B).
129. Id. § 14071(b)(4). Registrants must immediately report any change of
address to the designated state law enforcement agency. Id. If the registrant
moves to another state, the state agency must notify designated law enforcement
officials of the new state into which the registrant moves. Id.
130. Id. § 14071(c). The statutory section provides in pertinent part that "[a]
person required to register under a State program ... who knowingly fails to so
register and keep such registration current shall be subject to criminal penalties in
any State in which the person has so failed." Id.
131. Id. § 14071 (b) (1), (b)(6)(A).
132. Id. § 14071 (f) (2). The Bureau ofJustice Assistance Grant Programs sets
procedures for the allocation and distribution of funds to the states to improve the
states' criminal justice systems and to assist multi-state organizations in the drug

control problem. Id. § 3751(a). Ten percent of the funds a state would have been
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One of the more controversial provisions of Title. XVII of the Crime
Bill provides for community notification when a sexually violent predator
moves into a neighborhood after his or her release from prison.13 3 Generally, the state registration programs must treat registrant information as
private data.' 3 4 The release of information, however, is permitted if "necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person required to register." 13 5 Essentially, the statute grants local law enforcement authorities
broad discretion in determining whether to disseminate information regarding a particular registrant.' 3 6 In addition, disseminating officials are
13 7
immune from liability under the Crime Bill for "good faith conduct."
III.

THE PROBLEM WITH DETERMINING WHEN DISCLOSURE TO THE
COMMUNITY Is APPROPRIATE

The Crime Bill and state notification statutes have left two problems

unaddressed that call into question the viability of community notification
schemes. First, both the Crime Bill and many state notification statutes fail
allocated will be withheld if a state fails to comply with the registration provisions.
Id. § 14071(0 (2).
133. Id. § 14071(d). This provision is entitled "Release of Information" and
states in pertinent part:
The information collected under a State registration program shall

be treated as private data except that

-

(1) such information may be disclosed to law enforcement agencies
for law enforcement purposes;
(2) such information may be disclosed to government agencies conducting confidential background checks; and
(3) the designated State law enforcement agency and any local law
enforcement agency authorized by the State agency may release relevant
information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific
person required to register under this section, except that the identity of
a victim of an offense that requires registration under this section shall

not be released.
Id.

134. Id.
135. Id. § 14071 (d) (3). The statute reads in pertinent part, "information collected under a State registration program shall be treated as private data except
that ... the designated State law enforcement agency ... may release relevant
information... [as] necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person
required to register under this section." Id.

136. Id. While the Attorney General must establish guidelines for developing
state registration programs, the Attorney General is not required to specify the
amount of discretion vested in local law enforcement officials in making decisions
to disseminate registrant data. See id. § 14071(a), (d) (specifying mandatory actions and failing to include any provision regarding scope of discretion).
137. Id. § 14071(e). This subsection, entitled "Immunity For Good Faith
Conduct," provides that "[1]aw enforcement agencies, employees of law enforcement agencies, and State officials shall be immune from liability for good faith
conduct under this section." Id. Thus, it appears that the only check on the con-

duct of local law enforcement authorities is the requirement that they disseminate
information in "good faith." See id. (providing no other requirements within
subsection).
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to safeguard against the erroneous dissemination of information, which
may implicate an individual's right to privacy.' 3 8 Second, these statutes
require that officials determine an individual's potential for future dangerousness based on the individual's past behavior, a task that is not without
39
its difficulties.'
The possibility that notification laws will encourage the erroneous dissemination of registrant information implicates two diverging interests:
an individual's right to privacy and a community's interest in notification. 140 The Supreme Court has recognized certain privacy rights arising
from the due process guarantees of the Fifth 141 and Fourteenth Amendments. 14 2 The right to privacy restricts governmental action in areas concerning an individual's interest in making decisions concerning certain
fundamental matters1 43 and an individual's interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal information.'"
138. See, e.g., id. (providing immunity from liability for good faith but erroneous dissemination of information); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-9 (West 1995) (providing immunity from civil and criminal liability for providing or failing to provide
information); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550(2) (West Supp. 1995) (providing
immunity from civil liability for releasing or failing to release information).
139. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(a) (2)-(3) (permitting sentencing court to
make sexually violent predator determination upon receiving report from state
board of behavioral experts and defining "sexually violent predator" as person convicted of sexually violent offense who suffers from disorder making person likely to
engage in predatory sexually violent offenses); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8 (providing
notification guidelines for determining offender's risk of re-offense based on factors relating to offender's past conduct); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(1)
(West 1992 & Supp. 1995) (providing for individual's classification as sexually violent predator based on prior conviction and predicted future propensity to perform predatory acts of sexual violence); see alsoJoseph J. Romero & Linda Meyer
Williams, Recidivism Among Convicted Sex Offenders: A 10-Year Followup Study, 49 FED.
PROBATION 58, 63-64 (1985) (noting significant differences in criminal histories of
sex offenders and gaps in understanding sex offender recidivism).
140. See, e.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 411 (N.J. 1995) (finding that notification statute implicates both privacy, interest of sex offender and state interest
justifying disclosure). In Doe, the Supreme Court of NewJersey balanced the plaintiff's interest in privacy against the state's interest in disseminating registration
information and concluded that the state interest in public disclosure substantially
outweighed the plaintiff's interest in privacy. Id. at 406-13. For a further discussion of Doe, see supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
141. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides in pertinent part that no person shall "be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
142. See id. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part that "[n] o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." Id.
143. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.26 (1977) (noting liberty interest
in making certain important decisions in matters concerning marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing and education); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that right to privacy constitutes fundamental right and protects women's decision whether to have abortion).
144. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 (recognizing individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965)
(invalidating state law forbidding contraceptive use because enforcement of stat-
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The right to privacy that community notification laws implicate is the
individual's right to limit disclosure of information about himself or
herself.145 An individual's right of privacy, however, is not without limits.' 46 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of South
Carolina noted in an action for invasion of privacy that the right of privacy
is not absolute and, in most cases, the court must resolve a conflict between the rights of the individual and the interests of society and a free
press. 147 The court recognized that the public has an interest in the dissemination of news and the press has a duty to publish such news, qualified only by the law of libel and an individual's right to have his private life
48
protected.'
Information regarding the release of a convicted sex offender into a
community is arguably newsworthy. 149 For example, the Louisiana legislature addressed the privacy issues presented by community notification laws
ute would violate right to privacy by requiring investigation into intimate aspects of
marriage); see also Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article:
The Emerging Unencumbered ConstitutionalRight to InformationalPrivacy, 10 N. ILL. U.

L. REv. 479, 487 (1990) (describing one branch of privacy law to be extent to
which persons may limit dissemination of information about themselves). Professor Turkington explained that the right to informational privacy has multiple
branches which are "granted in the common law of torts, contracts, estates, federal
and state constitutions, federal and state statutes, and federal and state agency regulations." Id. (footnotes omitted).
145. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-99 (recognizing privacy right to safeguard
personal information but holding that state interest in compiling data on prescription drug use outweighed plaintiffs' privacy rights); Doe v. Borough of Barrington,
729 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that resident's constitutional right to
privacy was violated when borough's agents disclosed that resident was infected
with HIV); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 875 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (concluding
that state correctional facility medical personnel violated individual's right to privacy by disclosing prison inmate's status as HIV-positive to nonmedical prison staff
and other prison inmates), aff'd without opinion, 899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 44 (Cal. 1971) (holding that individual
established cause of action for invasion of privacy based on publication of individual's prior criminal conviction).
146. See, e.g., Firth v. Associated Press, 176 F. Supp. 671, 674 (E.D.S.C. 1959).
In Firth, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina
addressed whether publication of the plaintiffs' picture violated their right to privacy. Id. at 673-74. The plaintiffs were charged in the beating of a Camden, New
Jersey man. Id. at 673. The Associated Press made a composite wirephoto of the
plaintiffs and disseminated the photo by wire to its subscribers. Id. The plaintiffs
sued for invasion of privacy and libel. Id. The court stated that "[t] he public had a
right to know the facts and this right... was paramount to that of the plaintiffs."
Id. at 676. The court reasoned that by the issuance of a warrant and the arrest of
the plaintiffs, they became figures of public interest; therefore, the publication of
their pictures was not an unwarranted invasion of their privacy. Id.
147. Id. at 674.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Gwen Florio, The Legal Challenges of Megan's Law, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 29, 1995, at C1. Florio reports that within a week of Megan Kanka's
death, "people started clamoring for a way to let New Jersey neighborhoods know
when sex offenders were in their midst." Id.
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and stated its view that sexual offenders have a reduced expectation of
privacy because of the interest in public safety. 150 Moreover, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held in favor of community notification in Doe v.
Poritz, reasoning that the state interest in public disclosure substantially
5
outweighed the released offender's interest in privacy.1 '
The grant of discretion to law enforcement officials, combined with
the immunity provisions, however, may contribute to the erroneous distribution of registrant information.152 In Doe v. Poritz, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey addressed this problem in the context of protecting a released
offender's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests in privacy and reputation. 155 The Doe court concluded that considerations of fundamental fairness required that the state provide hearings to -a released offender prior
to community notification in order to ensure that his classification under
Megan's Law and the related consequences are "tailored to his particular
54
characteristics and are not the product of arbitrary action."'
In an apparent contradiction to the result in Doe and the Louisiana
legislature's determination that sex offenders have a reduced expectation
of privacy, most state registration programs provide for the confidentiality
of registrant information.' 55 In many states, the data is restricted to use by
150. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:540.A (West Supp. 1995). The statutory language provides in pertinent part:
Persons found to have committed a sex offense have a reduced expectation of privacy because of the public's interest in public safety and in the
effective operation of government. Release of information about sex offenders ...will further the governmental interests of public safety and
public scrutiny of the criminal and mental health systems.
Id.
151. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 411 (N.J. 1995). The court determined that
the plaintiff had only a "most limited expectation of privacy in the information"
disseminated under NewJersey's notification law. Id. Conversely, the court determined that the state had a strong interest in protecting the safety of the public
from sex offenders and characterized this interest as "clear and compelling." Id. at
412. For a discussion of the policy goals that notification statutes seek to serve, see
Michelle Pia Jerusalem, Note, A Framework for Post-Sentence Sex Offender Legislation:
Perspectives on Prevention, Registration, and the Public's "Right" to Know, 48 VAND. L.
REv. 219, 245-50 (1995) (concluding that notification laws do not adequately protect offenders' privacy rights).
152. SeeJolayne Houtz, When Do You Unmask a Sexual Predator?SEATrLE TIMES,
Aug. 30, 1990, at B2 (reporting that Tacoma, Washington police twice released
wrong information to press).
153. Doe, 662 A.2d at 417-22.
154. Id. at 421-22. The NewJersey notification statute allows local prosecutors
to determine the means of providing notification under the guidelines that the
State Attorney General promulgated. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8.d.(1)-(2) (West

1995). The Doe court, however, reasoned that community notification implicates
the released offender's interests in nondisclosure and in reputation, and con-

cluded that a pre-notification hearing was constitutionally required. Doe, 662 A.2d
at 420-21.
155. For a listing of state statutes that prohibit the disclosure of sex offender
registration information, see supra note 28.
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local law enforcement agencies. 156 Thus, these registration statutes implicitly recognize that a released sex offender's right to informational privacy is worthy of statutory protection. 157 Most state notification statutes
and the Crime Bill, however, fail to address the privacy concerns of released offenders while providing what amounts to blanket immunity from
158
civil liability for the erroneous dissemination of registrant information.
This omission is at odds with state registration laws that provide for the
limited disclosure of information. 159
A second problem with community notification laws is that the success of any notification program rests, in part, on the assumption that local
law enforcement officials can identify with certainty which released sex
offenders constitute such a threat to society that their presence in the area
merits community notification. 160 There is, however, no guarantee that
the designated officials will accurately make such determinations. 16 1 Even
156. For a listing of state statutes where the registration data is generally restricted to use by local law enforcement agencies use, see infra note 157.
157. See, e.g., AR. CODE ANN. § 12-12-909 (Michie Supp. 1993) (authorizing
release of data to law enforcement officers); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-412.5(6)
(Supp. 1994) (noting that General Assembly found that persons convicted of sex
offenses have reduced expectation of privacy because of public's right of safety);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para. 150/9 (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1995) (prohibiting

public inspection of registration data); Ky.REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.510(11) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994) (finding that registration information was not accessible to public); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) (allowing
dissemination of information for law enforcement purposes); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 632-A:17 (Supp. 1994) (requiring confidentiality of information provided
by individual required to report); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 584 (West 1991 &
Supp. 1995) (providing access to information acquired under statute only to law
enforcement personnel); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-16(i) (1994) (allowing inspection
of records only by law enforcement personnel); W. VA. CODE § 61-8F-5 (Supp.
1994) (same).
158. For a discussion of the relevant Crime Bill provisions, see supra notes
136-37 and accompanying text. For a review of Washington's statutory immunity
provisions, see supranote 83. For a review of NewJersey's immunity provisions, see
supra note 5. For a review of Louisiana's grant of statutory immunity, see supra
note 84.
159. For a list of state statutes that either prohibit public disclosure of registrant information or that permit only limited disclosure, see supra note 28.
160. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(d) (West 1995) (permitting disclosure of registrant information by state and local law enforcement officials when "necessary to
protect the public concerning a specific person"). For a further discussion of state
statutes that permit the disclosure of registrant information, see supra notes 77-119
and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-6 to -10 (West 1995). For example, in
New Jersey, the determination as to whether a released sex offender poses a low,
moderate or high degree of re-offense is made by a prosecutor-not by a medical
professional. Id. Registrant information may be released to the public based on
the prosecutor's decision. Id. In Washington, the police are permitted to release
information concerning sex offenders to the public. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 4.24.550 (West Supp. 1995). Each police department is allowed to create its own
notification policy. See Mary Ann Kircher, Registration of Sexual Offenders: Would
Washington's Scarlet Letter Approach Benefit Minnesota?, 13 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
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if erroneous information is disseminated, the Crime Bill fails to direct the
states to provide procedures for redress.1 62 On the contrary, Congress
placed minimal importance on protecting offenders against the mistaken
release of information by allowing state notification programs to grant of163
ficial immunity from liability for the erroneous dissemination of data.
IV. POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION

In addition to the lack of safeguards in disclosing information and the

difficulty ofjudging future behavior based on an individual's past conduct,
three additional issues went unaddressed in the frenzy surrounding the
rush by states to enact community notification laws. 164 One issue concerns the possibility that citizens will engage in acts of vigilantism to seek
retribution against released sex offenders.' 65 Acts of vigilantism erupted
shortly after the implementation of New Jersey's community notification

law, when two men broke into a house and beat a man they suspected was
a released sex offender. 16 6 Vigilante conduct also reportedly occurred in
POL'Y, 163, 171 (1992) (noting that each police department decides what information to release to each segment of population).
162. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(e) (providing immunity from liability for good

faith conduct without defining "good faith" or establishing procedures for violations of good faith standard).
163. Id. For a discussion of the Crime Bill provisions that permit community
notification and that provide for official immunity, see supra note 133-37 and accompanying text.
164. Gladwell, supra note 1, at A6. Mr. Gladwell noted that "an idea that [in
the fall of 1994] seemed so straightforward and common-sensible that it was passed
into law [in New Jersey] virtually without debate is tangled in controversy." Id.
165. See, e.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 430 (N.J. 1995) (Stein, J., dissenting) (discussing vigilante actions taken against two released sex offenders subject
to NewJersey's registration and notification provisions); Tracy L. Silva, Dial "1-900Pervert" and OtherStatutory Measures That ProvidePublic Notification of Sex Offenders, 48
SMU L. REv. 1961, 1983-84 (1995) (noting vigilante incidents occurred in Washington, Texas, New Jersey and Kansas following enactment of notification laws);
Houston, supra note 24, at 729-30 (discussing residents' protest to return of released sex offenderJoseph Gallardo to their neighborhood); Golden, supra note 2,
at 12 (reporting that paroled sex offender Larry Singleton was evacuated from his
home under guard away from angry mob and completed his parole in trailer on
San Quentin prison grounds).
166. Jay Richards, PhillipsburgMen Plead Guilty in Attack; Assault Stemmed From
Megan's Law Notification, MORNING CAU. (Allentown), June 10, 1995, at B3. Kenneth Kerekes, Sr. and Kenneth Kerekes, Jr. were arrested by Phillipsburg police on
January 8, 1995 for breaking into the house where released sex offender Michael
Groff was staying. Id. Kerekes, Sr. assaulted a houseguest after mistaking him for
Groff. Id. Groff was the first Warren County, NewJersey convicted sex offender to
have his address made public under Megan's Law. Id. Groff had been released
after serving four years of a 10-year-sentence for sexual assault and endangering
the welfare of a child. Id. Kerekes, Sr. pled guilty to fourth-degree criminal trespassing and simple assault charges and Kerekes, Jr. pled guilty to trespassing and
criminal mischief charges. Id.
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Washington following the enactment and the implementation of Washing167
ton's sex offender legislation.
A second issue concerns the effects of excessive ostracism directed
toward the released offender.' 68 Community residents might ostracize a
released offender to the extent that he or she will be unable to assimilate
into society. 169 The danger posed by the inability to assimilate is similar to
the danger posed by acts of vigilantism; the offender may find it so difficult to live in a particular community that he or she may simply relocate
170
elsewhere without providing notice to local authorities.
A third issue is the possibility that community notification and registration statutes may provide residents with a false sense of security. 171 Basically, these laws may lead residents to believe that local law enforcement
officials and residents know the whereabouts of a particular released offender.' 72 Ostensibly, these programs will give local officials and residents
167. Anderson, supra note 3, at 2-3. Anderson reports that between March
1990 and March 1993, there were 14 notification-related incidents in Washington.
Id. These incidents ranged from "offenders, and sometimes their families, receiving taunts to a case where one offender was punched in the nose when he opened
the door." Id.
168. See, e.g., Doe, 662 A.2d at 422. The Supreme Court of NewJersey noted
that "[t]here is no point in predicting the extent of potential ostracism, [or] in
avoiding the conclusion that some ostracism will result." Id.; Leonore H. Tavill,
Note, Scarlet Letter Punishment: Yesterday's Outlawed Penalty Is Today's ProbationCondition, 36 CtEv. ST. L. REv. 613, 641 (1988) (noting dangerous sex offender warning

requirements are not proper means for encouraging probationer's development
of normal lifestyle and encouraging career and respectable friendships).
169. See, e.g.,
Golden, supra note 2, at 12 (reporting story of Alan Jay Groome
who was released into Washington community after being incarcerated in juvenile
lock-up for raping two boys). The Shelton school system refused to admit
Groome, and after the police informed apartment complex residents about
Groome's record, the apartment manager evicted Groome and his mother from
their apartment. Id.
170. Martone, supra note 5, at 39 (noting that notification laws may cause sex
offenders to avoid treatment and seek safety of anonymity by hiding out, thus subjecting public to greater risk).
171. Ovetta Wiggins, Towns Consider Tracking Convicts; Critics Cite False Sense of
Security, THE REcoRD (Northern NJ.), Sept. 13, 1994, at Dl. Ed Martone, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, was quoted as
stating that community notification laws may "create a false sense of security." Id.
He stated that, "to think that the government is going to watch over me, it's not
going to happen." Id.; see also Porter, supra note 80, at 12 (noting that trusted
relatives and neighbors inflict sexual abuse more frequently than strangers).
172. See, e.g., John Sullivan, Sexual Attack on Youth Shows 'Megan's Law' Limit,
N.Y. TuMEs, Aug. 1, 1995, at B5. Twenty-eight-year-old John Edward Greene, a previously convicted sex offender, was arrested and charged with attacking a 15-yearold boy in an apartment complex four miles from the motel where Greene resided. Id. Greene registered with the police as required by Megan's Law, but the
police did not notify the community about Greene's status because they were waiting for a court decision on the law's constitutionality. Id. Residents in the apartment complex, however, were aware of Greene's background because Greene's
mother had told neighbors that he had recently been released from prison. Id.
This news passed from tenant to tenant. Id. Thus, even though Greene registered
with the police and residents knew of Green's criminal background, the attack still
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some idea of where a registrant resides, but most statutes impose a duty to
register with little means of enforcing this duty. 173 For the most part, state
registration statutes and notification laws merely impose penalties on
those who are required to register but fail to do so. 174 Two unintended
occurred. Id. One police detective stated, "[w]e couldn't keep Greene on any
more track unless we watched him 24 hours a day and the system doesn't provide
THE REcoRD, Aug. 13, 1995, at 1.
Shortcomings are present in the Crime Bill as well, in that it only requires that
sexual predators verify their address every 90 days and all other registrants provide
address verification annually. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(b) (3) (B) (West 1995). No
other procedural safeguards are required by the Crime Bill to ensure registrants
actually reside where they stated they would. See id.
Even when a released offender registers with local law enforcement authorities, there is no guarantee that the police will be able to prevent a re-offense. Mark
Davis & Chris Conway, Molester Loses Bid in Shore Case; Wider Megan's Law Urged,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 1, 1995, at B5 (reporting released sex offender charged with
sexual assault of teenager had registered with police as required under Megan's
Law, but still allegedly committed sexual offense).
173. See Houston, supra note 24, at 740 (arguing severe penalties and law enforcement officials' willingness to prosecute offenders who fail to register are only

for that." Mike Kelly, Megan's flaw,

effective means to ensure registration). For a discussion of state statutes that impose penalties on individuals for the failure to register, see infra note 174.
174. See, e.g., ALA.

CODE

§ 13A-11-203 (1994) (providing for imprisonment of

one to five years and fine of up to $1,000 for failure to register); ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3824 (1989) (mandating that failure to register is class six felony); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 12-12-903 (Michie Supp. 1993) (providing that failure to register constitutes Class A misdemeanor); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-412.5(4) (Supp. 1994)
(stating that those who fail to register are guilty of class two misdemeanor or class
six felony); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120(g)(2) (Supp. 1994) (stating that persons who fail to register more than twice are guilty of Class G felony for all subsequent failure to register violations); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.22(3) (f) (1) (West Supp.
1995) (providing that failure to register constitutes third degree felony); IDAHO
CODE § 18-8311 (Supp. 1995) (stating failure to register constitutes felony punishable by up to five years imprisonment and up to $5,000 fine); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
730, para. 150/9 (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1995) (providing that failure to register constitutes Class A misdemeanor); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-507 (1993) (stating that failure to register may result in imprisonment for minimum of 90 days or
imposition of fine up to $250 or both); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 207.157 (Michie
1992 & Supp. 1993) (providing that failure to register constitutes misdemeanor);
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-6 to -9 (West 1995) (providing that persons required to
register who fail to do so are guilty of crime of fourth degree); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 57, § 587 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995) (stating that person who fails to register is
guilty of misdemeanor and shall be subject to incarceration for up to one year and
to fines of up to $1,000 or both); TEx. REv. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c.1, § 7
(West Supp. 1995) (mandating that if person fails to register, he or she commits
Class A misdemeanor); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5(11) (1994) (providing that
sex offender who knowingly fails to register be sentenced to term of incarceration
for minimum of 90 days and to probation for at least one year); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.44.130(7) (West Supp. 1995) (mandating that one who knowingly fails
to register is guilty of felony or gross misdemeanor depending on crime of conviction); Wis. STAT. § 175.45(6) (Supp. 1994) (stating that individual who intentionally fails to provide information may be fined up to $10,000 or imprisoned for up
to nine months or both). For a discussion of the Crime Bill provision that makes it
unlawful to fail to register when one is required to do so, see supra note 130 and
accompanying text.
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effects of New Jersey's Megan's Law illustrate the "false sense of security"
problem: released offenders have often given false addresses 175 or have
176
failed to register at all.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The recent changes in federal and state legislation reflect a nationwide shift in concern toward victims' rights. 177 The movement in legislation at the state level-from requiring the registration of sex offenders to
the enactment of civil commitment statutes to the emergence of community notification laws-signifies a trend toward placing increased restrictions on released sex offenders. 1 78 This trend has been reinforced by
President Clinton's signing of the Crime Bill. 179 While the public interest
in being safe from the potentially dangerous conduct of sex offenders is
strong,18 0 that interest must be evaluated against treatment and rehabilitative considerations that would serve to protect society as a whole. 18'
Community notification laws appear to provide a viable means of protecting citizens, but it is difficult to determine who is a "sexual predator,"
to ascertain what information merits dissemination, and to decide to
175. Gladwell, supra note 1, at A6. The false address problem is exacerbated
by the fact that the police acknowledge that they lack the resources to check the
addresses of released offenders. Id.
176. See Lawrence Van Gelder, Offenders Ignore 'Megan'sLaw,'N.Y.

TIMES,

May

2, 1995, at B1 (noting that New Jersey figures compiled to support Megan's Law
show only 910 of estimated 4,000 ex-convicts, parolees and sex offenders on probation have filed their names and addresses with police).
177. Lawrence Wright, A Rapist's Homecoming, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 4, 1995,
at 56, 68. Wright states that "[ajll over the country, states are passing legislation
similar to Megan's Law." Id.
178. See id. (noting that 44 states require sex offenders to register with authorities, 15 states allow indefinite commitment of sex offenders and 27 states have
community notification laws). For a discussion of state registration laws, civil commitment laws and community notification laws, see supra notes 23-119 and accompanying text.
179. For a discussion of the community notification provisions of the Crime
Bill, see supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 411 (N.J. 1995) (noting state interest in disclosing sex offender registration information to public substantially outweighs sex offender's interest in privacy). For a discussion of one sex offender's
continued criminal sexual assaults after his release from prison, see supra note 43.
181. Id. at 422-23. The Supreme Court of NewJersey noted that "[w]hat government faced here was a difficult problem, a question of policy, and it understandably decided that public safety was more important than the potential for

unfair, and even severe, impact on those who had previously committed sex offenses." Id.; see alsoJerusalem, supra note 151, at 232 (asserting rehabilitation of

sex offenders is preventive and should be policy objective of sex offender legislation); Tavill, supra note 168, at 639-42 (noting rehabilitation is important to reducing crime problems but arguing "scarlet letter" probation conditions that require
signs be posted on sex offender's property warning neighbors by announcing
crime committed are ineffective to rehabilitate and reform offender's behavior).
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whom such information should be given. 18 2 There is general agreement,
however, that no clear method of curing sexually violent offenders exists,
and further, that it is not possible to make long-term predictions of dangerousness.1 83 Challenges to community notification statutes will undoubtedly continue to be raised in the courts as an increasing number of
84
states enact notification measures.'
Different interests are implicated by the use of registration laws, civil
commitment procedures and community notification statutes.' 8 5 At stake
in registration statutes is an individual's interest in being free from the
imposition of additional punishment in violation of the prohibition
against ex post facto laws. l8 6 The primary interest at stake in civil commitment statutes concerns an individual's liberty interest in being free from
unwarranted detention.18 7 The interests at stake with regard to commu182. See Doe, 662 A.2d at 422 (recognizing "the unavoidable uncertainty of
[the court's] conclusion" that notification law is constitutional). Doe illustrates the
difficulty of classifying sexual offenders and of determining the type of notice required under a notification law. Id. at 417-22. In Doe, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that a hearing is required prior to notification under Tiers Two and
Three of Megan's Law. Id. at 421. The court reasoned that principles of fundamental fairness "require procedural protections that will ensure that [a sexual offender's] classification, and its related consequences, are tailored to his particular
characteristics and are not the product of arbitrary action." Id. at 422; see alsoJulie
Shapiro, Sources of Scurity, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 843, 844 (1992) (discussing
problem of accurately identifying dangerous individuals in context of civil commitment statute).
183. Reardon, supra note 16, at 850. The Washington State Psychiatric Association has recognized that there is no scientifically valid treatment for sexually violent predators. Id.
184. See, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 18,613 (Attorney General's proposed guidelines for
the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act giving states three years to develop and implement registration and
notification programs); see also Doe, 662 A.2d at 413 (holding notification provisions of Megan's Law constitutionally sound and concluding that state interest in
protecting citizens outweighed defendant's expectation of privacy). But see Artway
v. Attorney General, 876 F. Supp. 666, 692 (D.NJ. 1995) (holding Megan's Law
unconstitutional on ex post facto grounds).
185. For a discussion of the constitutional challenges raised against state registration statutes, see supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the constitutional challenges raised against state civil commitment statutes, see
supra notes 46-74 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the constitutional
challenges raised against community notification laws, see supra notes 89-119 and
accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., State v. Costello, 643 A.2d 531, 534 (N.H. 1994) (acknowledging
that individual has right to be free from imposition of additional punishment but
holding registration statute does not impose additional punishment upon convicted offender in violation of Ex Post Facto Clause); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062,
1066-68 (Wash. 1994) (same); State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992)
(same).
187. See, e.g., Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 748-51 (W.D. Wash. 1995)
(addressing petitioner's argument that his confinement was unconstitutional preventive detention in violation of Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
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nity notification statutes involve the individual's right to privacy and the
18 8
right to be free from the imposition of additional punishment.
While all three types of laws serve the public interest in safety,18 9 the
issue is which approach or combination of approaches best serves citizens'
needs in the aggregate. The public interest in safety must be balanced
against the released offender's interest in receiving treatment, rehabilitating himself or herself, and remaining safe from citizens seeking retribution or revenge. When balancing these interests, community notification
laws sweep too broadly. 190 Mandatory registration requirements, when
coupled with broad grants of discretion to local authorities to determine
whether to disseminate information, have resulted in harm to innocent
third parties without producing a corresponding benefit in serving the
public interest in safety. 19 1 In addition, community notification laws re188. See, e.g., Doe, 662 A.2d at 387-406 (addressing petitioner's claim that
Megan's Law constitutes punishment); id. at 406-13 (addressing petitioner's claim
that Megan's Law violated his constitutional right to privacy as grounded in Fourteenth Amendment).
189. See, e.g., WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995)
(addressing safety concerns). The Washington state legislature was concerned
with the safety of its citizens when it made the legislative finding that "a small but
extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist [sic] who do not
have a mental disease... that renders them appropriate for existing involuntary
treatment act." Id. After determining that citizen safety was of significant importance, the legislature enacted procedures that allow for the civil commitment of
individuals determined to be sexually violent predators. Id.
Similarly, the Louisiana state legislature found that "sex offenders often pose a
high risk of engaging in sex offenses even after being released from incarceration
or commitment and that protection of the public from sex offenders is of paramount governmental interest." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:540A (West Supp. 1995).
The Louisiana statute goes further, however, by stating that an individual who has
committed a sexual offense has a reduced expectation of privacy because of the
state's interest in public safety and in the effective operation of government. Id.
Thus, the Louisiana statute concludes that the "release of information about sex
offenders . ..will further the governmental interests of public safety and public
scrutiny of the criminal and mental health systems." Id.
190. See, e.g., Artway v. Attorney General, 876 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1995). In
Artway, the district court held that the Tier Two and Three notification provisions
of Megan's Law constituted "more a form of punishment than a regulatory
scheme" and were therefore unconstitutional as retroactively applied to the petitioner. Id. at 692; see also 60 Fed. Reg. 18,613 (Attorney General's proposed guidelines for states to establish registration and notification laws stating that Crime Bill
does not impose any limits on standards and procedures that states may adopt for

determining when public safety necessitates community notification); Silva, supra
note 165, at 1981-82 (noting notification laws that treat high level and low level sex
offenders to same stringent notification provisions result in inequitable treatment
of offenders).
191. See, e.g., Doe, 662 A.2d at 430 (Stein, J., dissenting) (discussing vigilante
incidents that occurred shortly after effective date of Megan's Law); Silva, supra
note 165, at 1979-80 (quoting commentators' opinions regarding notification laws'
inability to guarantee reduction in occurrence of sex crimes); Tavill, supra note
168, at 642 (asserting public notification via warning signs on released offender's
property is ineffective to protect children, and that professionally educating children and enrolling offenders in intensive supervision programs for continuous
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suit in the public branding of released offenders that may increase the
potential for vigilante conduct. Finally, notification laws may encourage a
released offender to seek anonymity by moving to a new neighborhood,
thereby placing those residents at risk should the offender fail to register
with law enforcement officials in his or her new community. While Congress and many state legislatures acknowledge that community notification
may provide one method of helping to protect children from released sex
offenders, whether the states will develop and implement constitutionally
192
sound notification laws remains to be seen.
Christine M Kong
monitoring while receiving rehabilitative therapy is best solution to protect
children).
192. See, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 18,613. The United States Attorney General's proposed guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
Violent Offender Registration Act give the states broad discretion in formulating
registration and notification programs. Id. The proposed guidelines "give states
wide latitude in designing registration programs that best meet their public safety
needs" and do not impose any limits on the standards and procedures the states
may adopt for determining when public safety necessitates community notification. See id.
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